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ARTICLE

Speech-Facilitating Conduct
Wesley J. Campbell*
Abstract. Free speech doctrine generally protects only expression, leaving regulations of
nonexpressive conduct beyond the First Amendment’s scope. Yet the Supreme Court has
recognized that abridgments of the freedom of speech “may operate at different points in
the speech process.” This notion of protection for nonexpressive conduct that facilitates
speech touches on many of the most contentious issues in First Amendment law—
restrictions on photography and audiovisual recording, limits on campaign contributions,
putative newsgathering privileges for journalists, compelled subsidization of speech, and
associational rights, to name just a few. Scholars, however, have generally approached
these topics in isolation, typically focusing on downstream effects on speech as the
touchstone for First Amendment coverage. The usual conclusion is that the Supreme
Court’s decisions are in disarray.
This Article argues that key features of doctrine are easily overlooked when employing a
granular focus on particular rights. Instead, the Article presents an overarching
framework that brings together, descriptively and normatively, otherwise disparate
strands of free speech law. The guiding principle of this framework is that First
Amendment coverage for nonexpressive conduct depends on whether the government
uses a rule that targets speech (e.g., a special tax on newspapers), not on whether expression
is indirectly burdened by particular applications of otherwise constitutional rules (e.g., a
child labor law applied to newspapers). Applications of this “anti-targeting” principle vary
by context, but the general concept offers a surprisingly comprehensive account of most
Supreme Court decisions. Tracing the development of the anti-targeting principle also
reveals an underappreciated shift in the way that the Court has dealt with claims based on
nonexpressive conduct. This historical argument shows that the reasoning in many of the
Court’s foundational cases—including Buckley v. Valeo, Branzburg v. Hayes, Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, and Roberts v. United States Jaycees—is now out of step with current
doctrine.

* Executive Director, Stanford Constitutional Law Center; J.D., Stanford Law School,
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Webb, Danielle Zimmerman, Erik Zimmerman, participants in faculty workshops at
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the Stanford Law Review for helpful suggestions at various stages of this project.
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Introduction
A familiar, if sometimes nebulous, distinction between “expression” and
“nonexpressive conduct” undergirds modern free speech doctrine.1 Expressive
acts—from speaking and publishing to burning flags and dancing in the nude—
generally “bring the First Amendment into play,” triggering closer judicial
scrutiny.2 But when the regulated conduct is nonexpressive, courts often say
that the First Amendment does not apply at all.3 Expressive conduct does not
have to convey “a narrow, succinctly articulable message,”4 but the Supreme
Court has derided the idea that “an apparently limitless variety of conduct can
be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.”5
Yet it is widely recognized that some protections for nonexpressive
conduct are essential to basic First Amendment freedoms. Ordinary
commercial transactions are not expressive, for instance, but prohibitions on
the distribution or acquisition of printing presses or computers would raise
obvious First Amendment concerns.6 Picture taking and video recording are
often not expressive,7 but courts have ridiculed the “extreme” and
1. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (“[R]estrictions on protected

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

expression are distinct from restrictions on . . . nonexpressive conduct.”); Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“First Amendment cases draw vital
distinctions between words and deeds . . . .”). For more on the distinction between
“expressive” and “nonexpressive” conduct, including criticisms of this division, see infra
notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989); see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying
text.
See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)
(“The issue presented is whether respondents have a First Amendment right to solicit
contributions . . . . To resolve this issue we must first decide whether solicitation in
[this] context . . . is speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need
go no further.”); Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(“[A]lthough the Supreme Court has defined the boundaries of expression broadly, it
never has extended the protections of the First Amendment to non-expressive
conduct.” (citation omitted)).
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995);
see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (“[A] message
may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be communicative and that, in context,
would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative.”).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
See, e.g., Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (“[R]estrictions on protected expression are distinct
from restrictions on economic activity . . . .”).
See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1042 (2015)
(“The act of recording is not itself expressive in the way that burning a flag is
expressive because it does not communicate a message; it creates a message to be
communicated later.”); Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of
Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 270 (2004).

3

Speech-Facilitating Conduct
68 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2016)

“extraordinary” idea that such conduct “is wholly unprotected by the First
Amendment.”8 Similarly, although financial transfers are often thought of as
nonspeech, “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass
society requires the expenditure of money.”9
In this vein, the Supreme Court has recognized some First Amendment
protection for the speech process, and not merely the expressive end product.
“Laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in
the speech process,” the Court recently explained.10 To many, this notion of
protection for the speech process is intuitive. We can hardly “disaggregate
Picasso from his brushes and canvas,” or “value Beethoven without the benefit
of strings and woodwinds,” one court of appeals colorfully opined.11
But full First Amendment coverage for nonexpressive acts that are tied to
speech would quickly become unwieldy. “[F]ew restrictions on action,” the
Court observed fifty years ago, “could not be clothed by ingenious argument in
the garb of decreased data flow.”12 Confronted with claims for protection of
nonexpressive acts that facilitate speech, the Court has steadfastly remained
“unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to . . . an
uncertain destination.”13 How, then, should courts decide whether to apply
some form of elevated First Amendment scrutiny to governmental restrictions
of nonexpressive conduct?
The academic literature about First Amendment coverage for speechfacilitating conduct generally falls into three camps. First are studies that focus
on particular types of conduct, like gathering information, financing
campaigns, engaging in scientific research, or associating with others.14 A
second group of scholars takes a much broader approach by considering all
incidental burdens on speech, whether falling on expressive or nonexpressive
conduct.15 Finally, a third camp denies that a claimant’s expressive purposes
8. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 594 (7th Cir. 2012); see also A. Michael Froomkin,

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1511 (2000) (“It is inconceivable . . . that a
ban on capturing all photographic images in public could possibly be squared with the
First Amendment, any more than could a ban on carrying a notebook and a pencil.”); cf.
Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing a right to record).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). This insight is hardly novel. See, e.g.,
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he First
Amendment protects a process . . . .”); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“Liberty
of circulating is as essential to [press] freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without
the circulation, the publication would be of little value.”).
Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010).
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972).
See infra Part I.B; see also Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1035-36 (observing similarly the
literature’s disjointed treatment of speech-facilitating conduct).
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1175, 1200-10 (1996); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
footnote continued on next page
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implicate the First Amendment when the government regulates nonexpressive
conduct, but this group of scholars does not explore other ways that free
speech doctrine might cover nonexpressive conduct.16
This Article charts a different path by considering speech-facilitating
conduct as a distinct category within First Amendment law.17 The
nonexpressive conduct involved in these cases may come before speech (e.g.,
donating money or traveling to a protest) or afterward (e.g., receiving speaker
fees or traveling home). The potential reach of these rights is broad, but this
Article does not address protection for actions that count as “expressive” on
their own, like writing or delivering books.18 Rather, it explores the coverage
that the Supreme Court has provided and denied to nonexpressive conduct,
addressing only whether the First Amendment applies at all—not whether any
particular restriction can survive some form of elevated scrutiny.19
By looking at speech-facilitating conduct as a distinct category, an
overarching framework can bring together, descriptively and normatively,
otherwise disparate strands of First Amendment law. The guiding principle of

16.
17.

18.
19.

Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 491-500 (1996); Frederick
Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on
Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779 (1985); Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental
Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Motive-Based Rationalization of the
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401 (1995); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 105-14 (1987).
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769 (2001);
see also infra note 52.
This Article joins Ashutosh Bhagwat’s recent work in broadly considering how the
First Amendment applies to nonexpressive conduct related to speech. See Bhagwat,
supra note 7, at 1035. The scope of this Article and its historical orientation, however,
depart substantially from Bhagwat’s article, which addresses questions of First
Amendment coverage in much less depth than questions of protection. Bhagwat mostly
takes for granted that general laws pose no constitutional problem and that speechtargeted laws do, see id. at 1061, whereas this Article evaluates the long-running and
contested debates about those coverage issues.
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001).
As Frederick Schauer explains, “questions about the involvement of the First
Amendment in the first instance”—known as questions of coverage—“are often far more
consequential than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection that the First
Amendment affords the speech to which it applies.” Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries
of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1765, 1767 (2004); see also id. at 1771 (“Questions about the boundaries of the First
Amendment are not questions of strength . . . but rather are questions of scope—
whether the First Amendment applies at all.”). Confusingly, the Supreme Court
sometimes refers to questions of coverage as ones of protection, but—putting aside the
labels—the coverage/protection dichotomy underpins all of modern free speech law.
See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803-04 (1984)
(“[T]o say the ordinance presents a First Amendment issue is not necessarily to say that
it constitutes a First Amendment violation.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 561 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))).
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this framework is that coverage for nonexpressive conduct depends on
whether the government uses a rule that targets speech—including speechrelated rules that target the speech process.20 Applications of this “antitargeting” principle vary by context,21 but the general concept offers a
surprisingly comprehensive account of most on-point Supreme Court
decisions.
Examining speech-facilitating conduct as a distinct category also reveals a
substantial, yet mostly unannounced, shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to
First Amendment coverage for nonexpressive conduct. Prior to the mid-1980s,
the Supreme Court often treated all sorts of incidental burdens on speech as
implicating the First Amendment, even when the laws being applied did not
explicitly target speech.22 During this bygone era, the Court issued rulings that
continue to undergird some of the most significant and contentious areas of
free speech law, including newsgathering privileges, campaign finance law,
compelled-subsidy doctrine, and associational rights.
Ever since its 1986 decision in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,23 however, the
Court has mostly stopped applying First Amendment scrutiny to general (i.e.,
nontargeted) regulations of nonexpressive conduct.24 When nonexpressive
conduct is regulated, only the law—not individual expressive aims—can bring
the First Amendment into play. Conceptually, free speech rights in this field
operate as rules about rules, not as “shields,” “immunities,” or “trumps” that

20. Scholars have not used the anti-targeting principle to evaluate thoroughly the scope

21.

22.

23.
24.

and history of coverage for speech-facilitating conduct, but the principle is recognized
in opinions and in scholarship. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union,
513 U.S. 454, 474-75 (1995) (applying heightened review to a ban on public employees’
receipt of funds for speech because Congress “chose to restrict only expressive
activities”); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (applying heightened review to a speech-targeted law requiring
convicted criminals to turn over the proceeds of their book sales); Bhagwat, supra
note 7, at 1064 (“[P]resumably these [targeted] laws must be subject to some scrutiny.”);
Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically Right, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1095, 1101
(2002) (arguing that targeting “a constitutional right for a special burden” creates a
constitutional harm and therefore “restricting speech that uses money is a speech
restriction”).
In this sense, this Article proceeds on the unremarkable premise that general principles
are worthy of study despite the need for contextually tailored doctrine. See, e.g.,
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 83-84 (2001).
See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (applying heightened
scrutiny to an unlawful-entry charge); see also infra Part II (discussing cases prior to
1986).
478 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1986); see infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 n.3 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“A law is ‘general’ for the present purposes if it regulates conduct without
regard to whether that conduct is expressive.”).
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protect particular forms of speech-facilitating conduct against governmental
infringement.25
The Court’s decision in Arcara did not require overruling prior decisions,
and the Justices failed to mention their significant departure from earlier
reasoning—what some have described as “stealth overruling.”26 Confusion has
been widespread ever since. Scholarly assessments of newsgathering privileges,
campaign finance law, compelled-subsidy doctrine, and associational rights, for
instance, continue to rely on the outdated reasoning in seminal decisions like
Branzburg v. Hayes,27 Buckley v. Valeo,28 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,29 and
Roberts v. United States Jaycees.30 Broader analyses of the Court’s approach to
incidental burdens on speech similarly depend on old cases. In particular, this
Article takes issue with the arguments of Michael Dorf and Geoffrey Stone that
significant incidental burdens trigger heightened scrutiny.31 And beyond these
lines of cases, the failure to grapple with the Court’s shift has skewed
discussions of novel questions involving nonexpressive conduct, like how
courts should assess the constitutionality of restrictions on photography and
other forms of audiovisual recording.32
25. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional

26.

Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998) (using the term “shields”); Richard H. Pildes, Why
Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 725, 728 (1998) [hereinafter Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps] (adopting
the term “immunities”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at xi, 184-205
(1977) (employing the term “trumps”). All three of these authors have noted that
modern free speech doctrine often allows for regulations of speech for good reasons. See
Adler, supra, at 19-26; Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra, at 736-44; see also
Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 312-15
(2000) [hereinafter Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights] (exploring Dworkin’s
views); Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301,
302-07 (2000) (exploring Dworkin’s views also).
See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda
v. Arizona ), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (“When the Justices fail to extend a precedent as the
logic of its rationale would require, that is one form of stealth overruling.”); see also
Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 186263 (2014) (referring to this practice as “narrowing”).
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
468 U.S. 609 (1984). For an argument that the “general logic of compelled support
doctrine” is grounded in the reasoning of Buckley and Abood, see Micah Schwartzman,
Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317, 380 & n.203 (2011). My assessment of
compelled-subsidy doctrine appears in Part III.C.
See Dorf, supra note 15, at 1210; Stone, supra note 15, at 112-14.
A burgeoning set of cases and articles addresses this issue. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655
F.3d 78, 79-82 (1st Cir. 2011); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 260-62 (3d Cir.
2010); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 78, 81-83 (2014); Seth F.
Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the
Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 337-39, 367-69, 386-87 (2011); Howard M.
footnote continued on next page
1

27.
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.
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In sum, reexamining the Supreme Court’s approach to speech-facilitating
conduct offers fresh insights on a broad swath of free speech law. Part I begins
this effort by explaining the terms and categories that guide current free speech
doctrine. Part II turns to the pre-Arcara cases, showing that the Supreme Court
gave broad recognition to incidental-burden claims across a wide array of free
speech cases, even when laws did not target speech. This Part focuses on major
decisions relating to information gathering, campaign finance, compelled
subsidies, and associational rights.
Arcara and its progeny are examined in Part III. Two features, I argue,
define these cases. First, the government faces a heightened burden when it
singles out speech. This principle is relatively uncontroversial,33 but this
Article helps to explain its proper scope, particularly in Part IV. A law that
targets conduct closely related to speech—singling out newsprint for a special
tax, for instance—raises a First Amendment problem even if it does not target
the expressive end product. But while free speech doctrine is structured in part
to combat improper governmental motives, the anti-targeting approach
focuses on what the relevant law does, and not what actually motivated
legislators.34 Second, and more controversially, regulations of nonexpressive
conduct do not raise free speech problems when the government does not
target speech. In short, the First Amendment does not provide an “affirmative”
right to engage in speech-facilitating conduct. Rather, coverage for speechfacilitating conduct is “negative,” protecting against targeted governmental
interference with the speech process.35
This framework suggests that selective enforcement of general rules could
create a First Amendment problem.36 Nonetheless, this Article focuses solely
on challenges to legal rules and leaves enforcement questions for another day.
Critically, however, by viewing free speech rights in this area as a bar against
certain governmental actions rather than as a shield around particular
conduct,37 the anti-targeting framework rejects “as applied” First Amendment

33.

34.
35.

36.
37.

Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L.
REV. 600, 652-57 (2009).
But see United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 490 (1995) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (“The ban neither prohibits anyone from speaking or writing, nor does
it penalize anyone who speaks or writes; the only stricture effected by the statute is a
denial of compensation.”).
See infra Part IV.A.
The distinction between “affirmative” and “negative” conceptions of rights is common.
See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 15, at 782-83; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom
of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 155-56 (2010); see also infra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972); LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 38-39 (2005); Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 416.
See Adler, supra note 25, at 16 (employing this terminology).
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challenges to general laws neutrally applied to nonexpressive conduct.38 (This
Article, however, does not challenge the viability of “as applied” claims when
the restricted conduct is expressive.)39
The anti-targeting principle makes sense of Supreme Court holdings that
others have described as “remarkably erratic and fragmented.”40 In doing so, it
answers several looming First Amendment questions, including how to
evaluate free speech claims involving incidental burdens on expressive
associations, compelled subsidies for speech (e.g., bar dues and union-shop
dues), and putative newsgathering privileges for journalists. To flesh out how
the anti-targeting principle operates, Part IV considers its application to
restrictions on audiovisual recording—one of the most interesting emerging
issues in free speech law.
Beyond its historical and doctrinal arguments, this Article concludes in
Part V by sketching a brief normative defense of the anti-targeting approach.
That defense begins with the common recognition that values undergirding
the First Amendment readily support some measure of constitutional
protection for speech-facilitating conduct. But unlike most of its counterparts,
the anti-targeting framework eschews case-by-case balancing or doctrinal tests
that vary by speaker or subject. It further avoids assessments of the
“significance” of incidental burdens, or other questions that might depend on
cumbersome and indeterminate empirical inquiries. When it comes to
nonexpressive conduct, anti-targeting thus provides a doctrinal framework
that is more stable and predictable than its alternatives. Though all approaches
involve tradeoffs, focusing doctrine on laws rather than individual expressive
purposes adequately accounts for speech interests and concerns of judicial
economy.

38. Cf. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1994) (determining that

an injunction applied to abortion protestors did not target their viewpoint because
“[a]n injunction, by its very nature, applies . . . . in the context of a specific dispute”);
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1986) (applying no First Amendment
scrutiny to review a judicial order closing a bookstore because the applicable law was
neutral and generally applicable).
39. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
40. McDonald, supra note 7, at 251. McDonald’s comment relates to newsgathering cases,
but his criticism is common regarding other types of speech-facilitating conduct. See,
e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, Colloquy, It’s What’s for Lunch: Nectarines,
Mushrooms, and Beef—The First Amendment and Compelled Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 359, 365-67 (2007) (statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan) (describing “doctrinal
instability and incoherence” in compelled-subsidy doctrine).
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I.

Basic Principles
A. Expressive and Nonexpressive Conduct

“First Amendment law,” a prominent commentator explains, “view[s]
expressive and nonexpressive activity as meaningfully different, even though
drawing a line between the two raises hard questions.”41 Writing and speaking
are, of course, quintessential “speech,” but the First Amendment also provides
qualified protection to a wide array of “expressive conduct,” including so-called
“symbolic speech.”42 Burning flags, wearing black armbands, participating in a
parade, and even dancing in the nude are well-known examples.43 To
determine whether conduct is expressive, courts ask whether the conduct is
“imbued with elements of communication.”44 Expressive conduct need not
convey “a narrow, succinctly articulable message,”45 but mere intent to
communicate an idea or feeling is insufficient.46
Generally speaking, regulations of expressive conduct “bring the First
Amendment into play,” even when that conduct is circumscribed by a law
having nothing to do with speech.47 This Article—which emphasizes laws
rather than conduct when it comes to nonexpressive acts—does not challenge the
41. Kagan, supra note 15, at 491 n.207. For criticism of the division between speech and

42.
43.

44.
45.

46.

47.

conduct as “notoriously problematic,” see Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”:
Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 855-56
(2012). For the necessity of distinguishing between expressive and nonexpressive
activity, notwithstanding the difficulties, see Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967
Term—Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (1968); Elena Kagan,
Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 884 (1993);
and Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 902 (1979).
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
568-70 (1995) (parade); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality
opinion) (nude dancing); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (flag burning);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (black arm
band).
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam).
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569; see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
294 (1984) (“[A] message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be
communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to
be communicative.”).
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (disclaiming that “an apparently limitless variety of conduct can
be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea”); see also Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5 (“[T]he person desiring to engage in
assertedly expressive conduct [must] demonstrate that the First Amendment even
applies.”).
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; see also id. at 403 (“We must first determine whether Johnson’s
burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First
Amendment in challenging his conviction.”).
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general rule that restrictions of expressive acts trigger the First Amendment,
regardless of the law at issue.48 Applying a breach-of-the-peace statute to a
rowdy protestor, for instance, implicates free speech principles even though
the statute does not single out expression. The First Amendment, in other
words, usually “covers” expressive conduct,49 meaning that whenever a law
incidentally regulates expressive conduct, courts apply some form of elevated
judicial scrutiny.50
But what happens when the incidence of a law falls on nonexpressive
conduct? Suppose a journalist needs to eavesdrop on a source to complete an
exposé. Or a scientist needs to circumvent a ban on destroying embryonic stem
cells to create a publishable article. Or a photographer takes photographs
without obeying state privacy laws. How should courts decide whether to
apply some form of elevated scrutiny to these restrictions of nonexpressive
conduct?

48. Descriptively, this distinction reflects current law; the First Amendment treats

expressive and nonexpressive conduct differently for purposes of coverage.
Normatively, Part V offers some reasons why that distinction makes sense.
49. For the standard work on “coverage” and “protection,” see Frederick Schauer, Categories
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981).
50. When a law directly burdens expressive conduct, the Supreme Court considers, but
does not give talismanic importance to, whether the law targets expression. Here are
the basics: if the expressive aspect of conduct triggers a legal restriction, the Supreme
Court generally evaluates governmental interests “under a more demanding standard.”
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403. If the law or a particular application is content based, the Court
generally applies “the most exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S., 312, 321 (1988)); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2010).
Meanwhile, content-neutral laws that target expressive conduct usually receive
intermediate scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). But
even when the expressive aspect of conduct does not trigger the regulation, the Court
still uses a variant of intermediate scrutiny known as the O’Brien test to consider
whether particular applications of general laws comport with the First Amendment. See
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion) (endorsing “the
framework set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech”);
id. at 310 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the
plurality’s approach).
Scholars have disputed the extent to which expression triggers heightened scrutiny.
Compare Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1250-60 (1995) (challenging the idea that expression triggers heightened review),
and Schauer, supra note 19, at 1771 (describing “countless . . . instances” where
communicative acts are “not measured against First Amendment-generated standards”),
with Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1105-06 (2005)
(favoring First Amendment coverage for communicative acts that facilitate crime), and
Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct,
“Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1347
(2005) [hereinafter, Volokh, Speech as Conduct] (“When the law restricts speech because
of what the speech communicates—because the speech causes harms by persuading,
informing, or offending—we shouldn’t deny that the law is a speech restriction, and
requires some serious justification.”).
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B. Doctrinal Possibilities
Approaches to coverage for speech-facilitating conduct generally fall on a
continuum that focuses on the speaker, not the government. 51 At one pole, free
speech coverage is denied for all claims involving nonexpressive conduct
regardless of expressive aims or indirect effects on speech.52 A limitation on
giving money to an expressive group, for instance, would not raise a First
Amendment problem unless the act of giving money counted as “expressive.”
Some cases suggest this approach. “[A]lthough the Supreme Court has defined
the boundaries of expression broadly,” one Court of Appeals has opined, “it
never has extended the protections of the First Amendment to non-expressive
conduct.”53 At this pole, the distinction between expressive and non-expressive
conduct is absolutely crucial; restrictions of nonexpressive conduct do not
implicate the First Amendment at all.
At the other pole, heightened First Amendment scrutiny applies whenever
a regulation of nonexpressive conduct burdens an expressive goal—most
commonly when someone wants to engage in nonexpressive conduct for an
expressive reason.54 On this view, a limitation on giving money to an
expressive group would raise a free speech problem by diminishing the supply
of money used for speech. At this pole, the distinction between expressive and
nonexpressive conduct is less important, and the scope of First Amendment
51. This Article is not the first to offer a taxonomy of approaches to this problem.

Particularly useful, in my view, is Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First
Amendment Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1291, 1297-99, 1337-44 (2004).
52. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing the Rights of Privacy and the Press: A Reply to
Professor Smolla, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1152, 1156 (1999) (“[A] general law restricting
behavior is not vulnerable to a First Amendment challenge based on its impact in
restricting the gathering of information.”); Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and
the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 483 (1987) (“[T]he
first amendment does not generally protect noncommunicative preconditions of
speech . . . .”); Dana Remus Irwin, Freedom of Thought: The First Amendment and the
Scientific Method, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1479, 1504 [hereinafter Remus, Freedom of Thought]
(“[A]bsent very specific exceptions, the Court has never construed general
noncommunicative preconditions of speech as indispensable conditions of free
expression.”); Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1187 (2005) (“[N]o case recognizes a First Amendment investigative
privilege that provides immunity from generally applicable property and tort rules
like trespass.”); Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen
Tape Recording to Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1550 (2008) (“[T]he First
Amendment protects individuals . . . who distribute recordings of illegal police conduct.
But it probably does not protect individuals . . . who produce the recordings.”). These
works do not reject the idea of heightened scrutiny for speech-targeted laws, but their
focus is on individual conduct rather than on laws.
53. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
54. Cf. John A. Robertson, The Scientist’s Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51
S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1217-18 (1977) (“If the first amendment serves to protect free trade
in the dissemination of ideas and information, it must also protect the necessary
preconditions of speech . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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coverage is extraordinarily broad. Tax laws, environmental standards, and
labor laws, for instance, all routinely impose costs that could have derivative
effects on the supply of speech.
Not surprisingly, most scholarly accounts fall somewhere between these
extremes. Scholars who advocate First Amendment coverage for
nonexpressive conduct based on the effects on speech usually craft limiting
principles, lest expressive purposes trigger heightened review of nearly any
law.55
The most frequent proposals define First Amendment boundaries by
subject, asking what expressive goal is at stake. Scholars have debated an array
of possibilities. Subject-specific First Amendment rights could include a right
to gather news (which facilitates publishing news),56 a right to give money to
political campaigns (which facilitates political speech),57 a right to be free from
compelled giving (which otherwise facilitates undesired speech),58 and a right
to engage in scientific research (which facilitates publishing scientific
articles).59 These categories could be further delineated—limiting informationgathering claims, for example, to instances where the desired information is of
public rather than private concern.60
55. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 7, at 327.
56. See, e.g., id. at 273-308, 327. Other key pieces in this voluminous literature include

57.

58.

59.

60.

Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV.
927, 938-39 (1992); RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s Privilege, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 1221, 1223-25 (2013); Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to
Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097 (1999); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, I Spy: The
Newsgatherer Under Cover, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1197-1200 (2000); Diane L.
Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposal for the
Constitutional Protection of the News-Gathering Process, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641, 646-48.
See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1054 (1985) (favoring First
Amendment protection for campaign contributions because “[t]hose who give to and
spend on election campaigns are intrinsically legitimate participants in the ongoing
process of representative democracy”). For other discussions of free speech rights in the
context of campaign contribution limits, see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462
(2014); Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813
(2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19 (2010); and Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 665-67 (1997).
See, e.g., Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 202-03. Micah Schwartzman notes the logical
relationship between laws that limit contributions and those that compel
contributions. See Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 381-82.
See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 54, at 1217 (“As an essential step in the process of
dissemination of ideas and information, research should have the same constitutional
status as dissemination itself.”). Other contributions to this literature include James R.
Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639 (1979); and
Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other “Abridgments” of Scientific Research:
The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L.J. 979 (2005).
See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 7, at 338 n.301 (proposing a “news value” test).
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Other proposals seek to limit who gets First Amendment protection. Newsreporting privileges, for instance, might be confined to journalists.61 Coverage
could similarly depend on where the nonexpressive conduct takes place,62 or on
the degree to which the regulations burden certain speakers.63 Geoffrey Stone
and Michael Dorf both argue that significant incidental burdens on speech
ought to trigger elevated scrutiny.64 Finally, many scholars assert that First
Amendment interests should give way when the rights of others are
infringed.65
Speaker-focused approaches rest on the familiar distinction between
protected and unprotected conduct—the idea that some conduct is constitutionally
privileged, while other conduct is not.66 That distinction reflects how we
typically talk about rights,67 and it fits with a commonsense understanding
that rights protect individuals. “From the perspective of a rightholder,” Dorf
points out, “the severity of a law’s impact has no necessary connection to
whether the law directly or incidentally burdens the right’s exercise.”68 In
other words, usually people care most about whether their actions are lawful,
not why they might be unlawful. Modern substantive due process doctrine
seems to exemplify this way of thinking about rights as protecting certain
types of conduct against governmental infringement.69 And, as explained in
Part II, the Supreme Court focused on protection for certain types of conduct
in many of its decisions prior to the mid-1980s.
But speech rights do not have to fall on this speaker-focused continuum.
The First Amendment could instead “direct our attention to the law rather than
to the conduct prohibited by a particular application.”70 Indeed, as Matthew
61. See Jones, supra note 56, at 1239 (“By its very designation, a constitutional reporter’s

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.
69.
70.

privilege applies only to a ‘reporter,’ and thus mandates a threshold showing that the
party seeking the constitutional protection qualifies occupationally for the privilege.”);
see also Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, 120 HARV. L. REV. 990, 996-98 (2007)
(discussing various statutory and constitutional approaches for privileging journalist
activities).
For instance, the First Amendment might afford special solicitude for expressionrelated conduct that takes place in public fora or other public places. See Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599-600 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment).
See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
See Dorf, supra note 15, at 1210; Stone, supra note 15, at 112-14.
See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 54, at 1206. This limiting principle could be used to
determine “coverage” or “protection,” or both.
See, e.g., id. at 1204 (asking whether scientists “have a legal right to conduct research”).
Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, supra note 25, at 311 (“I believe [a conductbased view] is the dominant view of rights in the contemporary political culture
(though I do not know how one would prove that).”).
Dorf, supra note 15, at 1177.
See id. at 1219-21.
Id. at 1185-86; see also Samaha, supra note 51, at 1294.
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Adler observes, many constitutional rights—including some free speech
rights—“function not as shields around particular actions, but as shields against
particular rules.”71 The Supreme Court has mostly adopted that view of the
Free Exercise Clause, holding that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”72 Individuals, in other words, cannot
obtain constitutional exemptions when laws happen to conflict with their
religious beliefs and practices; the “right” of free exercise is a rule about rules,
not a shield around particular behavior. Justice Scalia has advocated (without
success) for an analogous principle in free speech cases, proposing that
heightened scrutiny should be limited to situations “[w]here the government
prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes.”73
C. Anti-Targeting
How would a focus on laws rather than conduct work in the context of
restrictions of speech-facilitating conduct? This question is explored in greater
depth in Parts III and IV, which argue that the Supreme Court now uses a lawfocused approach to assess regulations of nonexpressive conduct. But it is
useful to offer a preliminary sketch. In short, a law-focused approach can be
based on an anti-targeting concept. Laws regulating nonexpressive conduct
raise free speech concerns when those laws single out speech—including
speech-related rules that target the speech process. At the same time, however,
the speech-restrictive effects of general (i.e., nontargeted) laws do not trigger
heightened scrutiny when those laws are neutrally applied to regulate
nonexpressive conduct.
In most cases, applying the anti-targeting principle is straightforward. For
example, riding a public subway is not expressive, and therefore standard
metro hours are immune from a First Amendment challenge. If a late-night
71. Adler, supra note 25, at 16 (emphasis added); see also Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps,

supra note 25, at 730-31 (articulating a similar “structural” account of rights).
72. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,

263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). But see Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (holding that
religious institutions are sometimes constitutionally exempt from neutral, generally
applicable labor laws).
73. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 577 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis omitted). Justice Scalia has advocated for an overarching
framework that treats the structure of free exercise and free speech claims alike. See id.
at 579; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (asserting, perhaps inaccurately, that “generally
applicable laws unconcerned with regulating speech that have the effect of interfering
with speech do not thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the
First Amendment”). This Article makes a more limited argument. See supra notes 39, 48
and accompanying text.
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protestor insisted that a public subway extend its usual hours of operation for
his convenience, he and his free speech argument would get nowhere. An
ordinance barring the use of the subway to attend protests, however, would
raise clear First Amendment problems.74
Still, targeting could be defined in different ways. The concept could refer,
for instance, to the subjective intentions of governmental actors, asking
whether they are motivated by speech-related effects. Targeting could also
refer to whether the law, evaluated objectively on its face, singles out speech.75
For purposes of this Article, targeting refers to an objective concept, thus
avoiding unwieldy inquiries into subjective intentions and maintaining greater
consistency with current law across a wide array of constitutional doctrines. 76
At the same time, however, the anti-targeting principle bars not only laws that
facially single out speech but also laws that, evaluated contextually, have an
apparent disproportionate effect on speech. This caveat, common in other
areas of constitutional law, helps avoid the common problem of
“gerrymandering.” A special tax on newsprint, for instance, would facially
target only a particular type of printing paper—not expression itself—but its
disproportionate effects on expression would be facially apparent.
Readers might wonder how the anti-targeting framework—which
accounts for a law’s anticipated effects—differs from a speaker-focused approach
that applies heightened scrutiny based on indirect effects on speech. The
answer is that the anti-targeting framework focuses on laws rather than on
individuals. A speaker-focused approach allows for free speech exemptions
when otherwise valid laws happen to burden speech. A proponent of this view,
for instance, might argue that journalists should sometimes be allowed to
disregard general laws, or that newspapers should be able to hire low-cost
teenagers to deliver papers notwithstanding child labor laws. The antitargeting approach, by contrast, rejects the idea of exemptions from general
laws when the restriction falls on nonexpressive conduct. Instead, the antitargeting principle focuses on whether the relevant law targets speech either
on its face or by targeting conduct that is closely related to speech.77
Deciding whether a law has an apparent disproportionate effect on speech
will sometimes be difficult. Part IV explores this challenge in greater detail, but
74. This scenario is expropriated from Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens

United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 421 (2013).
75. Of course, objective tests often serve as administrable proxies for assessing subjective

motives. See John Hart Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1978).
76. See infra Part IV.A.
77. Again, my only concern in this Article is First Amendment coverage. “Questions about
the boundaries of the First Amendment are not questions of strength—the degree of
protection that the First Amendment offers—but rather are questions of scope—
whether the First Amendment applies at all.” Schauer, supra note 19, at 1771.
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it is worth emphasizing up front that this Article eschews any claim to clarity
in all cases. Close questions are inevitable, and some ambiguity in this area may
even be a benefit, allowing doctrine to develop over time as judges confront
real cases. Importantly, however, a focus on laws rather than on individual
conduct provides substantial predictability for speakers—giving precedents a
well-defined effect (i.e., laws are either constitutional or not), while moving
doctrine away from a rigid reliance on the speech/conduct distinction.78 Part V
offers a normative defense of anti-targeting and takes a closer look at its
challenges and tradeoffs, but for now we can return to a brief sketch of the
concept.
Laws that single out nonexpressive acts undertaken for an expressive
purpose present the clearest example of targeting. Consider the example
mentioned above: an ordinance barring use of public subways to attend a
protest. Ordinary travel on a subway is not expressive, but the ordinance raises
free speech concerns because it singles out speech activities for particular
disadvantage. The same issue arises even if the incidence of the law does not fall
directly on conduct that facilitates speech. An ordinance barring subway use by
groups of speakers—journalists or lobbyists, for example—would not directly
target speech-facilitating conduct, but it would nonetheless target speech by
using a speech-related rule.
These hypothetical ordinances could be viewed as direct regulations of
speech under the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.79 But the antitargeting principle applies even when that characterization is unwarranted.
Consider, for instance, campaign contribution caps. Assuming that campaign
donations facilitate speech but are not themselves expressive acts, campaign
contribution ceilings do not directly burden expressive conduct. Nonetheless,
contribution caps plainly target speech-facilitating conduct by singling out
donations used for campaigning.80 Compelled monetary transfers that are
designed to fund someone else’s speech present a similar problem.81 As these
examples illustrate, the anti-targeting principle ensures that the government
stays presumptively neutral not only toward speech acts and speakers but also
78. The anti-targeting approach uses the speech/conduct distinction, too, but it reduces

reliance on that distinction by applying heightened scrutiny in many cases where the
regulated conduct is nonexpressive.
79. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally prohibits the government from
requiring “a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary
benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no
relationship” to the regulated right. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
80. Even accepting Justice White’s point that “many expensive campaign activities . . . are
not themselves communicative or remotely related to speech,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 263 (1976) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
campaign contribution limits could still trigger heightened scrutiny because they
target campaigns, whose mission is expressive.
81. See infra Part III.C.
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toward “conduct commonly associated with expression.”82 This idea—as
Part IV argues—calls for heightened scrutiny when laws target conventional
means of expression (that is, objects conventionally used for expressive
reasons), such as phones, televisions, computers, printers, and so forth.83
II. Before Arcara
In order to understand current doctrine, we need to appreciate how the
Supreme Court’s approach has evolved. This Part, which explores the Court’s
treatment of speech-facilitating conduct prior to its 1986 decision in Arcara,
focuses on four lines of cases: (1) information-gathering cases; (2) campaign
finance law; (3) compelled-subsidy doctrine; and (4) associational rights. Part III
then reevaluates each of these areas, exposing dramatic changes in the Court’s
jurisprudence along with confusion sown by the Court’s failure to identify or
grapple with those shifts.
A. Information Gathering
Information-gathering cases arise when someone asserts a qualified right
to gather information—often “newsworthy” information—for use in
subsequent expressive acts.84 Prior to the mid-1980s, the outcomes in
information-gathering cases were consistent with the anti-targeting principle,
but the Supreme Court’s reasoning sometimes revealed an approach that let
indirect effects on speech trigger First Amendment coverage.
Information-gathering claims had a rocky start. In Zemel v. Rusk—a free
speech challenge to the Cuba travel embargo—the Court flatly denied that “a
First Amendment right . . . [was] involved” in merely gathering information.85
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren explained:
[T]he Secretary’s refusal to validate passports for Cuba . . . is an inhibition of
action. There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
82. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759-61 (1988). The Court in

Lakewood decided to allow a facial challenge to a licensing scheme because the
regulation was not a general law but instead was “aimed at conduct commonly
associated with expression.” Id. at 760-61.
83. Uses of expressive media—such as radio, music, and film—to disseminate audiovisual
content would usually count as “expressive” without resort to doctrines relating to
nonexpressive conduct. See, e.g., Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589
(1954) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Motion pictures are of course a different
medium of expression than the public speech, the radio, the stage, the novel, or the
magazine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction between the various methods
of communicating ideas.”); see also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948) (“Loudspeakers are today indispensable instruments of effective public speech.”).
84. The legal concept of “newsworthiness” typically refers to information “of legitimate
public concern.” See, e.g., Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2007).
85. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
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ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the
prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen’s
opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the
way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House
a First Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it
the unrestrained right to gather information.86

Importantly, the Court noted that the restriction on travel had not “result[ed]
from any expression or association.”87 The travel restriction, in other words,
did not target speech.
Several years later in Branzburg v. Hayes,88 however, the Supreme Court
seemed more receptive to the possibility of constitutional protection for
newsgathering. Branzburg involved journalists who objected to testifying about
their confidential sources. Revealing this information to grand juries, they
argued, would deter their sources “from furnishing publishable information, all
to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First
Amendment.”89
For the most part, the Court squarely rejected the journalists’ claims.90
Though acknowledging that “without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,”91 the five-Justice majority
was acutely concerned with the potential breadth of newsgathering rights. “It is
clear,” Justice White wrote for the majority, “that the First Amendment does
not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the
enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.”92 Pointing to
Zemel v. Rusk, he observed that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally,”93 and that it would be “frivolous” to claim a constitutional
right to violate otherwise valid criminal laws.94 “Although stealing documents
or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information,” Justice White

86.
87.
88.
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 16.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 679-80. Specifically, they argued that journalists generally should not have to
testify about confidential sources unless the government is able to show that the
information is relevant and otherwise unavailable, and that “the need for the
information is sufficiently compelling to override the claimed invasion of First
Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure.” Id. at 680.
Id. at 690 (“We are asked to . . . interpret[] the First Amendment to grant newsmen a
testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do.”).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 691.
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explained, “neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such
conduct, whatever the impact on the flow of news.”95
Yet the Branzburg decision is frustratingly ambiguous. To begin with, the
Court framed its discussion by observing that “a State’s interest must be
‘compelling’ or ‘paramount’ to justify even an indirect burden on First
Amendment rights.”96 It then proceeded to apply elevated scrutiny. “On the
records now before us,” the Court remarked—intimating a possible limitation
on its holding—there was “no basis” for giving constitutional priority to
journalists based on a “consequential, but uncertain, burden on news
gathering.”97 The effect of subpoenas on newsgathering was “unclear” and “to a
great extent speculative,” producing “widely divergent” estimates.98 Worried
about where recognition of journalist privileges might lead, the majority
cautioned that it was “unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult
journey to such an uncertain destination.”99 With more clarity about the
speech effects of reporter subpoenas, however, perhaps the Court’s conclusion
would have changed.
Justice Powell—one of the five Justices who joined the majority opinion—
wrote a short concurrence. A claimed privilege, he emphasized, “should be
judged on its facts,” balancing governmental interests against the freedom of
the press.100 “The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on
a case-by-case basis,” he argued, “accords with the tried and traditional way of
adjudicating such questions.”101
No wonder lower courts were thoroughly confused by Branzburg. The
majority had rejected the asserted privilege, seemingly in categorical terms. But
the Court nonetheless applied heightened scrutiny, and Justice Powell’s
“enigmatic” concurrence—as the dissenting Justices put it102—provided further
hope to proponents of a reporter’s privilege. Following the decision, many
lower courts read the unusual combination of opinions as supporting the
availability of a reporter’s privilege in certain cases.103
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 693-94.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Powell continued to adhere to this view of
Branzburg in his later writings. See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859-60 (1974)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“[A] fair reading of the majority’s analysis in Branzburg makes
plain that the result hinged on an assessment of the competing societal interests
involved in that case rather than on any determination that First Amendment
freedoms were not implicated.”).
103. See, e.g., In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1982); Bruno &
Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594-96 (1st Cir. 1980).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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Subsequent information-gathering cases ventured down the same trail.
The Court, for the most part, steadfastly rejected case-specific exemptions. But
the Justices often applied some form of heightened scrutiny to determine
whether certain categories of speech-related conduct should be constitutionally
protected. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, for instance, the Court acknowledged that
the First Amendment was “implicated” by the application of a travel restriction
that barred a communist from entering the country to speak at an academic
conference.104 Like in Branzburg, however, the Court nevertheless rejected the
asserted right because it “would prove too much.”105 Were courts to recognize
such a right, either “every claim would prevail,” thus nullifying the travel
restriction, or “courts in each case would be required to weigh the strength of
the audience’s interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver to
the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet undetermined
standard.”106
A series of “access” cases raised the same concern, reflecting continued
divisions about how to approach speech-facilitating conduct.107 In Houchins v.
KQED, Inc.,108 for instance, the Court split over whether journalists should be
exempt from certain prison visitation rules. The plurality opinion of Chief
Justice Burger firmly rejected the journalists’ First Amendment claim,
explaining that it would require judges “to fashion ad hoc standards, in
individual cases, according to their own ideas of what seems ‘desirable’ or
‘expedient.’”109 A constitutional interest was at stake, he acknowledged, but this
interest did not justify a First Amendment right to nonpublic information.
“The public’s interest in knowing about its government is protected by the
guarantee of a Free Press,” the Chief explained, “but the protection is indirect.
The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official
Secrets Act.”110 Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and
104. 408 U.S. 753, 755-56, 765 (1972).
105. Id. at 768.
106. Id. at 768-69. The Supreme Court employed similar arguments to reject a claim that

107.
108.
109.
110.

“education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective
exercise of First Amendment freedoms.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Although acknowledging that education promotes “a system of
freedom of expression,” the Court held that this effect does not warrant “judicial
intrusion,” the “logical limitations” of which are “difficult to perceive.” Id. at 36-37.
See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-35 (1974).
438 U.S. 1 (1978).
Id. at 14 (plurality opinion).
Id. (quoting Potter Stewart, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, “Or of the Press,”
Address at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974), in 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975)). Justice Stewart agreed with the plurality’s premise that
the Constitution does not grant journalists access to nonpublic information, but he
argued that the press—as a constitutionally privileged conduit for public information—
should be granted a few special privileges (like being allowed to use recording
footnote continued on next page
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Powell. “Without some protection for the acquisition of information about the
operation of public institutions,” they claimed, “the process of self-governance
contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its substance.”111
The contours of doctrine were thus heavily contested as the Supreme
Court entered the 1980s. Although the Court had consistently rejected
information-gathering claims, the shifting majorities, pluralities, and
concurring opinions varied in their approaches to threshold questions. Most
importantly, the Justices remained divided about whether First Amendment
coverage should depend on the distinction between expressive and
nonexpressive conduct.
The Court’s first putative recognition of an information-gathering right
came in a pair of access decisions in the early 1980s addressing whether the
closure of a criminal courtroom abridges the freedom of speech. Justice
Brennan’s view, which the Court adopted in 1982, deserves the most attention.
“Read with care and in context,” Justice Brennan wrote in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, prior cases indicated that “access to governmental
information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the
information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality.”112
Interestingly, however, Justice Brennan did not locate an access right in the
First Amendment’s ordinary guarantee “to protect communication between
speaker and listener.”113 “[T]he First Amendment,” he explained, “embodies
more than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange
for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our
republican system of self-government.”114 This structural component, he
insisted, “links the First Amendment to that process of communication
necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for
communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful
communication.”115
Justice Brennan recognized the practical challenges of applying First
Amendment protection to nonexpressive conduct that facilitates speech. “[T]he
stretch of this protection is theoretically endless,” he acknowledged, and

111.
112.

113.
114.
115.

equipment) to facilitate more effective performance of their constitutionally respected
role. Id. at 16-18 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
448 U.S. 555, 586 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Prior decisions,
Justice Brennan continued, “neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public
access to information may at times be implied by the First Amendment and the
principles which animate it.” Id.
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
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therefore “must be invoked with discrimination and temperance.”116 At first
glance, he seemed to endorse a case-by-case balancing test, “considering the
information sought and the opposing interests invaded.”117 Yet he tethered this
open-ended statement to two sturdier principles. Consideration of “public
access claims in individual cases,” he wrote, “must be strongly influenced by the
weight of historical practice and by an assessment of the specific structural
value of public access in the circumstances.”118 Using these historical and
structural guideposts, Justice Brennan concluded that the Constitution
presumptively guarantees a public right of access to criminal trials.119 Thus, as
late as the early 1980s, the Court was still willing to recognize a speech right
based on the incidental effects of a general rule.
B. Campaign Contributions
Governmental restrictions on contributions to political campaigns raise a
similar concern about coverage for speech-facilitating conduct, and not merely
for the expressive end product.
In the watershed case of Buckley v. Valeo,120 the Supreme Court famously
distinguished between limits on how much money campaigns may spend and
limits on how much money individuals may contribute. Restrictions on
campaign expenditures, the Court held, were essentially restrictions on speech
itself.121 But contributions were less protected by the First Amendment, thus
triggering a lower level of scrutiny.122
For purposes of this Article, the pivotal question is why campaign
contribution limits implicate the First Amendment at all. The Buckley opinion
offers two possibilities. First, contributions to political candidates “may result
in political expression . . . by someone other than the contributor.”123 In other
words, contributions are covered by the First Amendment because they
facilitate speech. Second, the Court seems to have recognized that campaign
contributions might be expressive. “A contribution serves as a general

116. Id. (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Dedication for the S.I. Newhouse Center for Law and Justice (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32
RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 177 (1979)).
Id.
Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 589-97. The Court explicitly adopted this framework two years later. See Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982).
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 20-23.
Id. at 21.

23

Speech-Facilitating Conduct
68 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2016)

expression of support for the candidate and his views,” the Court explained,
“but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.”124
This Article takes no position on whether campaign contributions are
sufficiently expressive to count as “speech” under the First Amendment—an
issue that strikes me as mostly an irrelevant distraction.125 Supreme Court
opinions and scholarly discussions point in both directions.126
For present purposes, the key point is that Buckley focused on the effects of
contributions. To be sure, the Court described contributing as a “general
expression of support” and a “symbolic act,”127 but these comments were made
to disparage the expressive value of the contributions. Buckley, we must
remember, came at a time when the speech/conduct distinction was still being
worked out and did not yet have threshold doctrinal significance. Thus, as
Kathleen Sullivan aptly explains, the doctrinally relevant point in Buckley was
that monetary contributions are conduct that “merely facilitate[s] or
associate[s] the contributor with speech,” whereas individual expenditures “are
more directly expressive.”128 In this way, Buckley supports a speaker-focused
124. Id.; see also id. (“[T]he expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
125.

126.

127.
128.

contributing.”).
Even if the First Amendment “covers” contributions as expressive conduct, the
government’s justification for restricting contributions has nothing to do with cutting
off their symbolic support for a candidate, and it is okay to limit expressive conduct
when the law seeks to prevent harms unrelated to the communicative impact of
speech. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291-96 (2000) (plurality opinion); id.
at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). But see BeVier,
supra note 57, at 1058-60 (offering a thoughtful rebuttal to this argument). Rather, the
constitutionally problematic aspect of campaign finance rules, in my view, is the
government’s patent effort to influence the distribution of speech resources. See infra
Part III.B; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17 (per curiam) (explaining that contributions are
not subject to O’Brien analysis).
Compare Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“Money is property; it is not speech.”), id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“[A] decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment
concern—not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech.”), and
Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 971 (2011) (“In
sum, giving and spending money are not expressive enough to warrant First
Amendment protection as speech.”), with Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech,
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 54 (1997) (“Gifts of money
and the expenditure of money are forms of speech.”). Scholars typically describe Buckley
as equating money and speech. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—
Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (2012) (mentioning “Buckley’s
debatable equation that ‘money is speech’”); David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo:
Eviscerating the Line Between Candidate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L.
& POL. 33, 35 (1998) (“Buckley effectively equated speech with money . . . .”).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (per curiam).
Sullivan, supra note 57, at 666. Deborah Hellman concludes that “it is not at all clear
that the Buckley Court really treats giving and spending of money as speech because it is
expressive, though it appears to endorse this rationale for doing so.” Hellman, supra
note 126, at 971.
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rather than law-focused approach to First Amendment coverage for
nonexpressive conduct.129
C. Compelled Subsidies
Compelled-subsidy cases present the mirror image of campaign finance
cases: instead of restricting monetary transfers that facilitate speech, the
government compels them (e.g., union-shop dues).130 Not surprisingly, these
cases raise a particularly challenging set of issues tied to free speech rights,
including associational rights. And scholars have rightly criticized the Supreme
Court’s response as both erratic and lacking a sound theoretical foundation.131
The seminal compelled-subsidy case is Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,132
decided only a year after Buckley. In Abood, a group of nonunion teachers
challenged a Michigan law requiring payment of union fees equal to regular
union dues.133 The Court divided the teachers’ First Amendment challenge in
two. First, the Court held that, although “compel[ling] employees financially to
support their collective-bargaining representative has an impact upon their
First Amendment interests,” the intrusion was “constitutionally justified”
because of the union’s pivotal role in collective bargaining.134 Essentially, the
government could require nonunion teachers to pay for collective-bargaining
expenses to prevent them from “free riding” on union efforts. Second, the
Court considered the teachers’ argument that they should be allowed to block
the union from spending mandatory fees on speech activities “unrelated to its
duties as exclusive bargaining representative.”135 On this issue, the Court ruled
in favor of the nonunion teachers.
Underlying the Buckley decision, the Abood Court explained, was the
principle that “contributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading a
political message is protected by the First Amendment.”136 This understanding
of Buckley was sound, but the Abood Court followed this statement with two
curious sentences:
129. But see Francione, supra note 52, at 460 n.150 (“Both Buckley and [First National Bank of

130.
131.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)] . . . involved speech, not noncommunicative
preconditions to speech. . . . Buckley and Bellotti simply do not support an argument that
noncommunicative preconditions to speech are protected by the first amendment.”).
See Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 381-82.
See Post, supra note 58, at 228 (“The only hope of avoiding a string of precedents as selfevidently ragged as [the compelled-subsidy cases] is to repudiate the premise of
[compelled-subsidy doctrine] and to rethink the fundamental question of when the
compelled subsidization of speech does and does not raise First Amendment issues.”).
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 234.
Id.
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The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from
making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of
their constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion
that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society
one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced
by the State.137

These are ill-fitting rationales. The monetary transfers were mandatory
irrespective of the teachers’ personal views, leaving the teachers perfectly free
to think and say whatever they wanted. To be sure, being forced to transfer
funds could violate an individual’s conscience.138 But the teachers did not claim a
religious or moral objection to funding the union’s speech.139
The better reading of the decision—notwithstanding the Court’s tortured
explanation—is that Abood is the mirror image of Buckley. In short, because
money can facilitate speech, being forced to give money can abridge the
freedom of speech. On this account, the lofty invocations of “freedom of
thought” and “belief” were rhetorically powerful but doctrinally useless; what
really mattered in Abood was the speech-facilitating aspect of the subsidies.
D. Associational Rights
Associating with others is a common way for individuals to pursue their
expressive goals, and therefore enjoys protection under the First Amendment.
Like nearly any other speech activity, associational activities involve a mix of
expressive and nonexpressive conduct. Consequently, restrictions of an
association’s nonexpressive acts—from the ways that it raises money, for
instance, to the rules it adopts regarding membership—can incidentally burden
speech, raising the question of how far nonexpressive conduct is covered in the
context of associational rights.
Yet again, the Supreme Court initially gave broad free speech coverage for
burdens placed on the nonexpressive conduct of expressive groups. This
Subpart focuses on two particularly contentious areas of associational law:
cases involving compelled public disclosure of membership lists, and
137. Id. at 234-35 (footnote omitted).
138. For a historical discussion of this issue, see Philip Hamburger, Religious Freedom in

Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603 (2005), discussing religious objections to paying an
“equivalent.”
139. See Post, supra note 58, at 227 n.134 (“It is odd to speak of violations of conscience in the
context of nonideological speech like beef advertisements.”). In the context of religion,
the term “conscience” usually refers to “categorical demands on action—that is,
demands that must be satisfied no matter what an individual’s antecedent desires and
no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up.” BRIAN LEITER, WHY
TOLERATE RELIGION? 34 (2012) (emphasis omitted); see also Michael W. McConnell,
Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 782 (2013) (reviewing LEITER, supra)
(agreeing with Leiter’s definition); cf. Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and
Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1489-94 (discussing other definitions of “conscience”).
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challenges to antidiscrimination rules when groups prefer not to admit certain
members. Because this Article addresses only freedom of expression, it does not
engage with the noteworthy suggestion that associational rights might be
derived from other parts of the Constitution.140
1.

Compelled-disclosure cases

The foundational compelled-disclosure ruling is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson.141 The famous civil rights case began when the Attorney General of
Alabama sought to enjoin the NAACP “from conducting further activities
within, and to oust it from,” Alabama on account of its unlicensed expressive
activities.142 At that point, the State also sought and obtained an extensive
discovery order imposing onerous burdens—including disclosure of the
organization’s membership lists—having no apparent connection to the order’s
ostensible purpose, which was to establish that the NAACP was engaged in
unlicensed activities.143 Contrary to popular belief, the case did not involve a
generally applicable disclosure rule; Alabama required all corporations to
register with the State before undertaking in-state activities, but the law said
nothing about disclosing membership lists.144
The NAACP appealed the discovery order on First Amendment grounds,
arguing that publicly revealing its membership would lead to backlash against
its members.145 The Supreme Court agreed. Disclosure, Justice Harlan
explained, was “likely to affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its
members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they
admittedly have the right to advocate.”146 In other words, disclosure would
indirectly burden speech, thus triggering free speech concerns.147

140. See, e.g., JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

(2012); Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 150 (2006);
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 981 (2011).
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Id. at 452.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 462-63.
The Court later explained that NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson recognized a “right to
privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs,” Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74
Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91 (1982), and that compelled disclosure “may burden
the ability to speak,” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010). The Court has tied
this right, however, to demonstrated burdens on speech. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 70 (1976) (per curiam) (“NAACP v. Alabama is inapposite where . . . any serious
infringement on First Amendment rights brought about by the compelled disclosure of
contributors is highly speculative.”).
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2.

Associational-membership cases

Another strand of freedom of association cases involves challenges to
antidiscrimination laws that override selective admission policies. For
instance, if a private group that engages in expressive activities wants to
exclude women or gay people, does it implicate the First Amendment for the
government to ban that discrimination? Consistent with its treatment of other
incidental burdens before Arcara, the Supreme Court initially applied
heightened scrutiny to incidental burdens that happened to fall on expressive
associations.
In the seminal case of Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court
considered whether the Jaycees—a group promoting civic participation by
young men—could be required to accept female members pursuant to a general
antidiscrimination law.148 The Court applied heightened scrutiny because the
group was forced to “accept members it does not desire.”149 First Amendment
review, in other words, did not depend on whether the law directly restricted
speech.150 As with other areas of free speech law, the Court viewed indirect
effects on speech as sufficient to trigger heightened review.
III. Current Doctrine
Looking back on the Supreme Court’s treatment of speech-facilitating
conduct from the 1960s through the early 1980s, two noteworthy features
emerge. First, reasoning scattered throughout the Court’s opinions showed
wavering support for some form of heightened scrutiny when the government
indirectly burdened speech. As late as the 1984 decision in United States v.
Albertini,151 for instance, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to review the
arrest of a protestor on account of his unlawful entry onto a military base.
Without considering whether the regulated conduct was expressive, the Court
simply stated that “[a]pplication of a facially neutral regulation that
incidentally burdens speech satisfies the First Amendment if it ‘furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest . . . .’”152
148. 468 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1984).
149. Id. at 623. Applying heightened scrutiny, the Court upheld the application of the

antidiscrimination law, finding “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of
women as full voting members [would] impede the organization’s ability to engage in
[its] protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.” Id. at 626-27.
150. For a defense of associational rights based on similar reasoning, see Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 840-41
(2005), which comments that expressive associations should obtain greater protection
for their nonexpressive conduct because they are “special sites for the generation and
germination of thoughts and ideas.”
151. 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
152. Id. at 687 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). Elena Kagan argues
that the Albertini decision may have been based on “a visceral sense that an illicit factor
footnote continued on next page
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The second notable feature of these cases, however, was uniformity in
outcomes. With only rare exception, the Court consistently rejected First
Amendment claims involving nonexpressive conduct that violated general
laws. Thus, while the Court was often saying one thing, results in a wide array
of cases suggested that it might have effectively been doing another.153
Indeed, the Justices were well aware of problems with protecting
nonexpressive conduct,154 and they increasingly suggested that free speech
coverage was limited to cases involving expressive acts. Shortly after Albertini,
for instance, the Court addressed whether the First Amendment provides a
right to solicit contributions. “To resolve this issue,” the Justices explained, “we
must first decide whether solicitation in [this] context . . . is speech protected by
the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need go no further.”155 Doctrine, it
seems, was ready for realignment.
The doctrinal status of speech-facilitating conduct came to a head in
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.156 This case arose when state officials in New York
sought to shut down an adult bookstore for at least a year because of repeated
sexual misconduct on the premises.157 Based on the impact of the closure order
on the bookstore’s expressive activities, the New York Court of Appeals
applied intermediate scrutiny under United States v. O’Brien and reversed the
order as “broader than necessary to achieve the restriction against illicit
commercial sexual activities.”158 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed.
The lack of targeting was pivotal. “[T]he sexual activity carried on in this
case manifests absolutely no element of protected expression,” the Court

153.

154.
155.

156.
157.
158.

entered into a governmental decision.” See Kagan, supra note 15, at 499. The better
explanation, in my view, is that the Court gave little thought to what it was doing and
simply grouped all incidental burdens into a common pool.
This argument simply posits a realist interpretation of judicial decisionmaking
without claiming that doctrine should necessarily align with a realist understanding of
past outcomes. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1084 (1990) (“[T]he legal realist’s effort to
discern the law by looking not to what courts say but what they do may well be a
valuable heuristic for predicting the outcome of any given case, but it is hardly an
acceptable method for deciding cases.”).
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985); see also
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 & n.5 (1984) (assuming
arguendo that “overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration is expressive
conduct protected to some extent by the First Amendment” and clarifying that “it is the
obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to
demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies”).
478 U.S. 697 (1986).
Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 702; see also id. at 700-02 (discussing procedural history).
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explained, “[n]or does the . . . New York Public Health Law inevitably single out
bookstores or others engaged in First Amendment protected activities for the
imposition of its burden.”159 In other words, the case involved the regulation of
nonexpressive conduct by a general law. Accordingly, in the Court’s view, the
First Amendment did not apply. The O’Brien test, Chief Justice Burger
explained for the Court, “has no relevance to a statute directed at imposing
sanctions on nonexpressive activity.”160
Nor did incidental speech-restrictive effects bring the First Amendment
into play. That argument, the Court declared, “proves too much.”161 Indeed,
“every civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First
Amendment protected activities.”162 For instance, someone “liable for a civil
damages award has less money to spend on paid political announcements or to
contribute to political causes, yet no one would suggest that such liability gives
rise to a valid First Amendment claim.”163 Thus, the Court held, regulations
having an incidental effect on speech activities trigger heightened scrutiny
“only where it was conduct with a significant expressive element that drew the
legal remedy in the first place,”164 or “where a statute based on a nonexpressive
activity has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive
activity.”165 In other words, expressive conduct and targeted laws each bring
the First Amendment into play, but general regulations of nonexpressive
conduct do not.
Following Arcara’s open embrace of anti-targeting when it comes to
speech-facilitating conduct, the Supreme Court has not looked back. In the
thirty years since the decision, the Court has affirmed over and over that
restrictions of nonexpressive conduct that incidentally burden speech do not
trigger elevated First Amendment review. As Jed Rubenfeld observes, “there is
no such thing as a free speech immunity based on the claim that someone
wants to break an otherwise constitutional law for expressive purposes.”167
The consistency of prior outcomes with the anti-targeting principle, however,
has led the Court not to overrule its earlier decisions, lending confusion to
several doctrinal areas.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 705-06.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id.; see also Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 410 (“The Court’s use of O’Brien and Clark to
illustrate the Arcara rule’s meaning suggests that the rule should be construed
narrowly, so that incidental restraints only concern the First Amendment when the
activity that draws the law’s application is itself used to express a message.”).
165. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706-07. For discussion of this category, see infra notes 256-73 and
accompanying text.
167. Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 769; see also supra note 52 (collecting sources).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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A. Information Gathering
Following Arcara, the Court has considerably backed off its earlier hint
that information-gathering claims might, in some circumstances, proceed
based on the incidental effects of general laws. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., for
instance, the Court held that journalists cannot receive First Amendment
exemptions from liability for breaching promises.168 But unlike in Branzburg,
where the Court observed that “a State’s interest must be ‘compelling’ or
‘paramount’ to justify even an indirect burden on First Amendment rights,”169
in Cowles Media the Justices did not seem to think that indirect burdens on
speech triggered heightened scrutiny. According to the Court, “generally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and
report the news.”170 Lower courts have recently followed suit, often
categorically rejecting newsgathering claims.171
The Court has consistently followed this approach ever since. The Justices
have explained, for instance, that trespassing laws can be enforced without
implicating the First Amendment, even when doing so incidentally burdens
speech.172 The same principle guided the Court’s declaration in Los Angeles
Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp. that “a governmental
denial of access to information in its possession” does not abridge the freedom
of speech and press,173 notwithstanding the obvious inhibiting effect that such
a denial may have on public debate.

168. 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991).
169. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972).
170. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669. The term “generally applicable law” has several meanings,

and the immediate purpose of the Court’s statement in Cowles Media was to clarify
“only . . . that the press gets no special exemption from press-neutral laws.” Volokh,
Speech as Conduct, supra note 50, at 1294. Thus, speakers may still “raise as a defense the
fact that the law is being applied to them because of their speech,” even if the law is
facially speech-neutral. Id. at 1296 (emphasis omitted). But Cowles Media also clarifies
that restrictions of nonexpressive conduct by general laws do not trigger heightened
review. See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669; Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 35 GA. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2001).
171. See United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 494 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2013). The Court has
characterized the Branzburg holding in a way that reflects this view. See Cowles Media,
501 U.S. at 669.
172. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 (2003). Writing before Hicks, Srikanth
Srinivasan argued that the Court’s earlier ruling in Albertini—applying O’Brien review
to a trespassing violation—“must be an exception to the Arcara rule.” Srinivasan, supra
note 15, at 413. In my view, the Court’s method of decision in Albertini simply does not
reflect current doctrine following Arcara. See supra note 152.
173. 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999).
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B. Campaign Contributions
Recent information-gathering decisions have shifted to an anti-targeting
approach, but the Court has yet to openly reorient campaign finance doctrine,
leading some scholars to conclude that “indispensable” preconditions of speech
are constitutionally protected.174 This view has considerable appeal. “In any
economy operated on even the most rudimentary principles of division of
labor,” Justice Scalia has explained, “effective public communication requires
the speaker to make use of the services of others.”175 Accordingly, “[t]he right to
speak would be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in
financial transactions that are the incidents of its exercise.”176 Indeed, as
previously explained, the Court’s foundational decision in Buckley v. Valeo
relied on the idea that contributions to political candidates “may result in
political expression . . . by someone other than the contributor.”177
As Justice White pointed out in his separate opinion in Buckley, however,
“the argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the
speaker violates the First Amendment proves entirely too much.”178 At the
heart of this concern was a recognition that countless laws affect speech. Tax
laws, labor regulations, environmental standards, and so forth, all routinely
impose costs—diverting countless dollars from speech activities.179 Sometimes
these costs are onerous. “But it has not been suggested, nor could it be
successfully,” Justice White aptly explained, “that these laws . . . are invalid
because they siphon off or prevent the accumulation of large sums that would
otherwise be available for communicative activities.”180
Sure enough, fourteen years after Buckley, the Supreme Court seemed to
clarify that heightened First Amendment review is not triggered whenever the
application of a rule “make[s] the exercise of First Amendment rights more
difficult,” even in situations where the restricted activity is “essential” or
“necessary” to engage in protected speech.181 The Court thus rejected a
university’s argument that being forced to turn over otherwise private tenurereview materials would negatively affect its expressive activities, explaining
that “if the University’s attenuated claim were accepted, many other generally

174. Remus, Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1496-97.
175. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 251 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in

the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
176. Id. at 252.
177. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1975) (per curiam); see also supra Part II.B.
178. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (1976) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
179. Id. at 263.
180. Id.
181. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (per curiam)).
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applicable laws might also be said to infringe the First Amendment.”182 But
why, then, do campaign contribution limits still pose a First Amendment
problem?
The Supreme Court’s inability to answer that question has left campaign
finance law in a state of uncertainty. A minority of Justices continue to assert
that restrictions on campaign donations trigger heightened scrutiny because
those donations facilitate speech.183 That approach, however, departs from the
Court’s general approach to restrictions of nonexpressive conduct. Other
Justices sometimes assert that campaign donations are expressive.184 But if that
is the relevant concern, then contribution limits ought to be upheld; the
justification for restricting contributions has nothing to do with their
symbolic effect.185
The anti-targeting framework supplies a more coherent explanation of
why campaign finance restrictions pose a free speech problem. In short,
singling out political campaigns triggers heightened scrutiny—not a misguided
notion that “any regulation of money is a regulation of speech.”186 Thus, while
the government can apply “general commercial regulations to those who use
money for speech if it applies them evenhandedly to those who use money for
other purposes,” it presumptively cannot target the expressive process of
political campaigning.187
In sum, giving money for speech purposes does not trigger heightened
review. What matters is the law. Although the Court has not explicitly adopted
anti-targeting as the guiding principle of campaign finance law, doing so
would maintain consistency with other free speech cases that involve money.
A law that “singles out income derived from expressive activity for a burden
the State places on no other income,” for instance, triggers heightened scrutiny,

182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)

184.

185.
186.
187.

(“[A] decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment
concern—not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech.”).
See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 636 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Another prominent
argument is that contributions are protected by the freedom of association. See, e.g., id.
at 637.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (criticizing this notion).
Id.; see also id. (“[W]here the government singles out money used to fund speech as its
legislative object, it is acting against speech as such, no less than if it had targeted the
paper on which a book was printed or the trucks that deliver it to the bookstore.”);
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1101 (making the same point). Of course, paper producers,
delivery trucks, and bookstores are subject to all sorts of general regulations that raise
no First Amendment problems.
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even though the speech-burdening effects of general income taxes do not.188
Targeted restrictions on the front end of the “speech process” raise the same
problem.189
C. Compelled Subsidies
Following Buckley, the Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education190 extended free speech coverage to compelled monetary transfers
used for speech.191 As the Court has cut back on free speech coverage for
nonexpressive conduct, however, the basis for Abood has been challenged. “It is
simply not true,” Robert Post insists, “that First Amendment concerns are
implicated whenever persons are required to subsidize speech with which they
disagree.”192 A trio of recent decisions illustrates the Court’s muddled but
improving efforts to find a sound principle to govern compelled-subsidy
doctrine.
In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., the Court upheld a mandatory
subsidy scheme requiring California tree-fruit growers to pool money to
advance mutual goals.193 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens began by
emphasizing that when the government regulates nonexpressive conduct,
incidental burdens on speech do not raise a First Amendment problem.194
Turning to Abood, Justice Stevens acknowledged that the law did “compel
financial contributions that are used to fund advertising.”195 But being forced
to subsidize tree-fruit advertising did not “engender any crisis of
conscience.”196 “The mere fact that objectors believe their money is not being
188. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116

189.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

(1991) (applying heightened review to a law requiring convicted criminals to turn over
the proceeds of their book sales); see also United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union,
513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (applying heightened review to a ban on public employees’
receipt of funds for speech because Congress “chose to restrict only expressive
activities”).
Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010) (“Laws enacted to control or
suppress speech may operate at different points in the speech process.” (emphasis added)).
Thus, for instance, heightened scrutiny should apply to laws restricting access to
otherwise public information based on the expressive aims of the person seeking the
information. See Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1079-80; cf. L.A. Police Dep’t v. United
Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 42 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (hinting at this
idea).
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
See supra Part II.C.
See Post, supra note 58, at 197.
521 U.S. 457, 460-61, 477 (1997).
Id. at 470. Similarly, the regulation did not require the fruit growers “themselves to
speak,” but “merely required [them] to make contributions for advertising.” Id. at 471.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 472.
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well spent,” he concluded, “does not mean [that] they have a First Amendment
complaint.”197 Justice Souter dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas, arguing that a lack of conscientious disagreement
with the tree-fruit advertisements was beside the point under Abood.198
The Glickman decision revealed a Court at odds over the basic features of
compelled-subsidy doctrine. The Court has not fully cleaned up this doctrinal
mess, but it has suggested a new direction, focusing on laws rather than
individual objections.
In United States v. United Foods, Inc., Justice Kennedy, joined by the four
Glickman dissenters, reinterpreted the Glickman decision and struck down a
nearly identical cooperative law, this time involving an advertising scheme for
mushroom farmers.199 The compelled contributions at issue in Glickman,
Justice Kennedy explained, were “part of a far broader regulatory system that
does not principally concern speech.”200 By contrast, the mushroom-grower
assessments were “not part of some broader regulatory scheme,” and thus “the
compelled contributions serve[d] [only] the very advertising scheme in
question.”201 In other words, Glickman involved a general subsidy scheme,
whereas the United Foods program was speech specific.
Robert Post has argued that we should “rethink the fundamental question
of when the compelled subsidization of speech does and does not raise First
Amendment issues.”202 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in United Foods advances the
ball further than Post lets on. The Court did not ground its holding on the
freedoms of belief and conscience,203 or on the mushroom growers’ desire not
to facilitate certain speech. Instead, Justice Kennedy asked whether the
government had forced the mushroom growers to associate for an expressive
purpose or, instead, for “a purpose . . . independent from the speech itself.”204 He
concluded that by compelling mushroom growers to join a private association
197. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

204.

435, 456 (1984)). The Court also explained that “assessments to fund a lawful collective
program may sometimes be used to pay for speech over the objection of some members
of the group,” so long as the expenses are germane to the speech-neutral purposes of the
group. Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 487-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
533 U.S. 405, 408-13 (2001).
Id. at 415 (quoting Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Glickman, 521 U.S. 457 (No. 951184), 1996 WL 629907).
Id.
Post, supra note 58, at 228.
See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413 (“Before addressing whether a conflict with freedom of
belief exists, a threshold inquiry must be whether there is some state imposed
obligation which makes group membership less than voluntary; for it is only the
overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in the
first place.”).
Id. at 415-16.
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for expressive ends, the government had encroached upon their freedom of
association.
This analysis reflects a substantial, and much-needed, departure in the
framing of compelled-subsidy doctrine. The constitutional defect that the
Court identified in United Foods was targeting—forced association for an
expressive purpose. Had the mushroom farmers been forced to associate for
nonspeech reasons, and had the association then engaged in speech activities
germane to that mission, the encroachment on speech interests would have
been “ancillary” rather than “the principal object of the regulatory scheme.”205
What matters under United Foods is the law—that is, whether the speech effects
are targeted or incidental.
The Court’s subsequent decision in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n206
seems to reinforce this shift in compelled-subsidy jurisprudence. Johanns
upheld a mandatory advertising fee imposed on beef producers because the
speech at issue was “government speech.”207 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia explained: “Citizens may challenge compelled support of private speech,
but have no First Amendment right not to fund government speech.”208
Notably missing from this analysis is any reference to the freedoms of thought
and conscience mentioned in Abood and Glickman. Indeed, Justice Scalia noted
that compelled-subsidy doctrine “invalidates an exaction not because being
forced to pay for speech that is unattributed violates personal autonomy, but
because being forced to fund someone else’s private speech unconnected to any
legitimate government purpose violates personal autonomy.”209
Johanns is still an uneasy fit with anti-targeting. After all, one could easily
argue that the beef-advertising program targeted speech by laying an
assessment for speech purposes.210 But separating two aspects of the program
might answer this difficulty. First, the beef producers—unlike the mushroom
farmers in United Foods—could not claim encroachment of their associational
rights because association with the government is assumed. Second, the
spending component of the program was immune from objection because
individuals generally cannot challenge governmental spending on free speech

205. Id. at 411-12; see also id. at 415-16 (noting that Glickman involved an “ancillary” speech

burden, whereas in United Foods “the expression respondent is required to support is
not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the speech itself ”).
544 U.S. 550 (2005).
Id. at 560-62.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 565 n.8 (emphasis added); see also id. (concluding that the First Amendment was
not infringed “simply because individual taxpayers feel ‘singled out’ or find the
exaction ‘galling’” (quoting id. at 575-76 (Souter, J., dissenting))).
Cf. Post, supra note 58, at 197 (“Johanns . . . never offers a theoretical account of why
taxation is an exception to the basic premise of [compelled-subsidy doctrine].”).
1

206.
207.
208.
209.

210.
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grounds. Thus, with both the assessment and spending components insulated
from challenge, the Court upheld the regulation.
Although compelled-subsidy doctrine remains in flux, it seems headed
toward stronger ground, consistent with other aspects of free speech doctrine.
Yet again, the Supreme Court’s treatment of speech-facilitating conduct seems
to have shifted to a focus on what the government is doing rather than on the
conduct of individual speakers. While the government cannot “compel a
particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for
speech on the side that it favors,”211 incidental burdens imposed through a
speech-neutral regulatory regime do not raise First Amendment concerns.212
To determine whether heightened scrutiny should apply, courts ask whether a
compelled subsidy exacts a disproportionate sum for speech activities in light
of any nonspeech purposes.213
D. Associational Rights
Associational rights, too, have evolved toward the anti-targeting
framework, although the Court has yet to fully consider how its general
treatment of nonexpressive conduct would affect associational doctrine. This
section begins by showing that an anti-targeting framework would not disturb
the Court’s disclosure holdings. It then assesses membership cases.
1.

Compelled-disclosure cases

As explained in Part II, the Court’s early compelled-disclosure decisions
supported a right based on the incidental burdens of disclosure on speech. But
two significant caveats are in order. First, these cases involved targeted
regulations. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, for instance, Alabama had
clearly retaliated against the NAACP because of the group’s expressive
activities, and the onerous discovery request—which was case-specific and not
generally applicable—was unrelated to the State’s claim.214 Subsequent
211. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001).
212. Id. at 415 (“[T]he majority of the Court in Glickman found the compelled contributions

were nothing more than additional economic regulation, which did not raise First
Amendment concerns.”).
213. Cases since Abood have essentially asked this question. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,
496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (holding that “[c]ompulsory [bar] dues may not be expended to
endorse or advance” speech unrelated to a bar association’s core mission, but lawyers do
not have a valid free speech claim against “compulsory dues being spent for activities
connected with disciplining members of the Bar or proposing ethical codes for the
profession”).
214. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1958); see also Dale
Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite
Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1524 (2001) (noting that the disclosure order was
intended to impair the NAACP). Stone writes that, “in NAACP v. Alabama, the Court
used strict scrutiny to test a state law, as applied to the NAACP, that required any
footnote continued on next page
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disclosure cases have involved other types of targeting, such as disclosure laws
that single out political campaigns.215
Even more to the point, forced public disclosure is a form of compelled
expression that forces organizations to communicate otherwise private
information to the public. According to the Supreme Court, “compelled
statements of fact[,] . . . like compelled statements of opinion, are subject to First
Amendment scrutiny.”216 Mandatory disclosure thus presents a
straightforward First Amendment problem under compelled-speech
doctrine.217 The Supreme Court has not considered how its general shift in
handling speech-facilitating conduct might apply to compelled disclosure of
membership lists, but an anti-targeting framework would not threaten those
decisions.
2.

Associational-membership cases

Unlike disclosure regimes, general antidiscrimination laws do not target or
compel speech. The application of antidiscrimination laws to expressive
groups thus provides a way of testing whether, in the context of associational
rights, restrictions of nonexpressive conduct implicate the First Amendment
because of their indirect effects on speech. (Having to admit unwanted
members, for instance, might decrease a group’s size or vigor, thus affecting its
speech.)218 Carefully assessed, the reasoning in these decisions shows a lack of
First Amendment coverage for indirect burdens on speech, thus supporting the

215.

216.

217.
218.

foreign corporation seeking to do business in the state to provide the state with certain
information, including the names and addresses of its members.” Stone, supra note 15,
at 111. Disclosure, however, was compelled by a case-specific discovery order, not a
general law. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 89-90 (1982)
(considering a First Amendment challenge to an Ohio law requiring political campaigns,
but not other organizations, “to file a statement identifying each contributor and each
recipient of a disbursement of campaign funds”); see also Carpenter, supra note 214, at
1525 (observing that associational claims often involve governmental actions with “the
goal of putting the screws on an expressive association”).
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006). And in
the context of expressive associations, disclosure of membership information raises
special concerns because it may reveal sensitive information about members’ views. See
Brown, 459 U.S. at 97 (noting that even disbursements to vendors may reveal their
“support for an unpopular cause”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam)
(“[F]inancial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and
beliefs.” (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring))).
Here, in contrast to the campaign finance context, see supra note 125, the government’s
justification for the law is based on the communicative effects of disclosure.
In any event, externally imposed membership requirements at least burden collective
expression, even if expressive output is unaffected. Individuals and groups do not have
to stop speaking before a burden counts as a burden.
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anti-targeting framework. And, yet again, the Court has quietly shifted its
approach.
As described earlier, Roberts v. United States Jaycees applied heightened
scrutiny to the application of a general antidiscrimination law that forced the
Jaycees to admit female members.219 After Roberts, however, the Court has
consistently upheld applications of general antidiscrimination laws without
applying elevated scrutiny so long as the regulation of a group’s membership
does not directly change its expressive message.
Several years after Roberts, the Court considered a case involving the
application of an antidiscrimination law to Rotary Clubs, which also excluded
women.220 The case was nearly identical to Roberts, but this time the Court
denied the claim without applying heightened scrutiny, concluding that in
light of the gender-neutral purpose of Rotary Clubs, being forced to accept
female members would not “affect in any significant way the existing
members’ ability to carry out their various purposes.”221 The decision did not
cite Arcara, but it reflects a parallel evolution in the Court’s treatment of
restrictions of nonexpressive conduct.222
The Court reaffirmed this approach in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. The
Boy Scouts, which barred openly gay men from serving as scoutmasters,
challenged the application of a general law banning discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation.223 The Court held that applying the law to the Boy
Scouts interfered with the group’s expressive rights.224
The Court’s reasoning in Dale focused on the direct impact of the law on
the group’s symbolic expression. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that “[t]he presence of an avowed homosexual and gay
rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly different
message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on
219. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
220. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 539 (1987).
221. Id. at 548. The Court noted in the alternative that, even if the act did “work some slight

infringement on Rotary members’ right of expressive association,” that infringement
would be justified by the state’s antidiscrimination goals. Id. at 549.
222. The Court later summarized: “The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group
infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person
affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints.” Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). Bhagwat notes a
broader turn in the Court’s association cases toward grounding in free speech
principles rather than a freestanding associational right. See Bhagwat, supra note 140, at
988-89. His point is well taken, but it should be noted that even if associational rights
had been grounded in free speech principles all along, associational doctrine still might
have undergone a significant transformation because of the shifts in free speech
doctrine described in this Article.
223. 530 U.S. at 643-44.
224. Id. at 644.
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record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy.”225 Accepting openly gay
scoutmasters thus, in the Court’s view, would have directly changed the
group’s message and its “method of expression.”226
Dale has been the subject of considerable controversy, often surrounding
the Court’s definition of “expressive associations.” Chief Justice Rehnquist gave
the term a seemingly broad reach, explaining that “associations do not have to
associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain message in order to be
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.”227 Instead, “[a]n
association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be
impaired.”228 Scholars have criticized this definition as far too expansive,
leading to widespread exemptions from antidiscrimination laws,229 and as far
too narrow, failing to recognize the speech rights of nonexpressive groups.230
A common perception seems to be that characterizing an association as
“expressive” is doctrinally significant. Expressive associations, under this view,
can obtain “First Amendment immunity from an otherwise constitutional law”
simply because of their expressive goals—a reading of Dale that would perhaps
support broad coverage for the speech-facilitating conduct of expressive
groups.231

225. Id. at 655-56.
226. Id. at 655; see also id. at 653 (noting that the Boy Scouts had sufficiently shown that

227.
228.

229.
230.

231.

“acceptance of a [gay leader] would impair its message”). The dissenting Justices in Dale
disagreed with this factual conclusion, arguing that the inclusion of a gay scoutmaster
would “send[] no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world.” Id. at 694 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Perhaps so, but the majority thought otherwise. Accordingly, Dale
essentially adopted Geoffrey Stone’s tentative suggestion that a general
antidiscrimination law might sometimes restrict expression if an exclusionary policy
“defines the organization ideologically and is a symbolic expression of policy.” Stone,
supra note 15, at 112; see also David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 121, 134 (2001) (noting the heavily fact-dependent nature of the
constitutional inquiry under Dale).
Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
Id.; see also id. at 648 (stating that “[t]he First Amendment’s protection of expressive
association is not reserved for advocacy groups” and applies when groups “engage in
some form of expression, whether it be public or private”).
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, How “Decentralization” Rationalizes Oligarchy: John McGinnis
and the Rehnquist Court, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 11, 27-28 (2003).
Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 119, 139 (2000). Epstein’s criticism, however, is mostly directed at the
Court’s view that associational rights are “derived from the free speech right, and from
the free speech right alone.” Id. at 140.
Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1157 (2002); see
also Carpenter, supra note 214, at 1570, 1573 (asserting that the Court in Dale “implicitly
followed the analysis of Justice O’Connor in Roberts,” and that “[a]n expressive
association, under this approach, enjoys a general exemption from anti-discrimination
law regardless of whether the particular application of the law trenches on a certain
message” (emphasis omitted)).
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These arguments overlook the central reasoning of Dale, which turned not
on whether an association is “expressive” but rather on whether particular
membership requirements directly affect an association’s symbolic speech.
Concluding that a group is expressive does not resolve this threshold question
of First Amendment coverage,232 and the Supreme Court was not granting
exemption rights to certain associations on account of their expressive goals.
Rather, Dale holds that groups have speech rights,233 and sometimes
membership requirements (such as those imposed by antidiscrimination laws)
directly interfere with a group’s message, either by forcing it to send symbolic
messages it does not want to convey, or by undermining symbolic messages it
does want to convey.234 In other words, Dale involved a regulation of expressive
conduct, based on a case-specific finding that a particular application of an
antidiscrimination law directly restricted symbolic speech.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, Inc.235 supports this understanding of associational rights as
protection for expressive conduct, not speech-facilitating conduct. The case
involved a federal funding condition that effectively forced private
universities to host military recruiters on campus.236 A group of universities
challenged the law, bringing both compelled-speech and associational claims.
The Court began by considering the compelled-speech claims. Recognizing
that the law, on its face, had little to do with speech,237 the Court explained
that forcing universities to host recruiters on campus did not directly affect the
universities’ messages. In prior cases, the compelled-speech violation “resulted
232. Other groups enjoy identical First Amendment protection in theory, but it is empty in

233.

234.
235.
236.
237.

practice because their lack of expressive purposes means that their membership would
not reflect a message that an antidiscrimination law could change. For that reason, the
Court correctly observed in Dale that “[t]o determine whether a group is protected by
the First Amendment’s expressive associational right, we must determine whether the
group engages in ‘expressive association.’” Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
Daniel A. Farber, Foreword: Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and
the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1495 (2001) (“The focus in recent cases such
as Dale . . . is on the rights of the organization as an entity, not on the rights of its
individual members.”). Recent decisions underscore this conclusion. See, e.g., Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (“The Court has . . . rejected the argument that
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently
under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771 (1978))).
I am not alone in this reading of Dale. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 140, at 150.
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 60 (“The Solomon Amendment neither limits what law schools may say nor
requires them to say anything. . . . As a general matter, the Solomon Amendment
regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must do—afford equal access
to military recruiters—not what they may or may not say.”). In addition, the law
required universities to advertise, but the Court upheld these requirements as
permissible content-neutral regulations. See id. at 62.
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from the fact that the complaining speaker’s own message was affected by the
speech it was forced to accommodate.”238 But being forced to host military
recruiters did not have that consequence “because the schools are not speaking
when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.”239 In short, the Court
emphasized, “a law school’s decision to allow recruiters on campus is not
inherently expressive.”240
The Court then rejected the universities’ associational claims for precisely
the same reason, noting that nonexpressive conduct does not enjoy
constitutional protection because of expressive aims. “The law schools say that
allowing military recruiters equal access impairs their own expression by
requiring them to associate with the recruiters,” the Court opined, “but just as
saying conduct is undertaken for expressive purposes cannot make it symbolic
speech, so too a speaker cannot ‘erect a shield’ against laws requiring access
‘simply by asserting’ that mere association ‘would impair its message.’”241 In
other words, the universities’ associational claims failed because the recruiteraccess rule did not directly impact expression.242
In sum, just as with other forms of speech-facilitating conduct, an
unannounced shift has taken place in associational doctrine. The Supreme
Court initially applied heightened scrutiny based on the incidental burdens of
general laws, even when falling on nonexpressive conduct. The reasoning in
more recent cases, however, has required more—a showing that changing a
group’s membership would directly alter its symbolic message.
238. Id. at 63.
239. Id. at 64.
240. Id.; see also id. at 65 (“Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any

speech by recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law
schools may say about the military’s policies.”); id. at 66 (“The expressive component of
a law school’s actions is not created by the conduct itself but by the speech that
accompanies it.”).
241. Id. at 69 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 653 (2000)).
242. The Court reiterated this conception of associational rights in Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). The Hastings Law School chapter of the Christian Legal
Society (CLS) objected that a putative “all comers” rule burdened its speech and
associational rights by requiring the group either to give up university recognition or
to accept students whose sexual conduct was inconsistent with the group’s mission. Id.
at 668. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg explained that it made “little sense to
treat CLS’s speech and association claims as discrete.” Id. at 680. Rather, the Court
explained, the group’s “expressive-association and free-speech arguments merge: Who
speaks on its behalf, CLS reasons, colors what concept is conveyed.” Id. “When these
intertwined rights [of speech and association] arise in exactly the same context, it
would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive constitutional review . . .
only to be invalidated as an impermissible infringement of expressive association.” Id.
at 681. The majority went on to uphold the law school policy as a reasonable condition
for access to governmental benefits under the “limited public forum” doctrine. Id. at
692-94.
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E. History and Speech-Facilitating Conduct
We are now in a better position to evaluate competing scholarly accounts
of First Amendment coverage for speech-facilitating conduct. Most scholars
agree that the Supreme Court treats general regulations of nonexpressive
conduct as not impinging on First Amendment rights, even when incidentally
burdening speech. But are there exceptions to this rule?
Geoffrey Stone argues that “[i]n a few decisions the Court has found
incidental restrictions unconstitutional,”243 particularly “when an incidental
restriction has a significant effect on free expression.”244 Elsewhere he explains
that “the Court has held incidental effects unconstitutional as applied when the
incidental effect of the law was seen by the Court as particularly severe.”245
Michael Dorf agrees, arguing that, “[a]s a general matter, free speech doctrine
treats substantial incidental burdens as raising a bona fide constitutional
problem and ignores most other incidental burdens.”246
Other scholars take a slightly different view of current doctrine, but one
that still recognizes limited constitutional coverage when incidental
restrictions have a derivative effect on speech. Dana Remus, for instance,
asserts that the Court has recognized protection for “indispensable”
preconditions of speech247—“a necessary corollary,” she argues, “to the right to
communicate information and ideas.”248 Thus, in her view, “the Court has
243. Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.

244.

245.

246.
247.
248.

185, 206 n.69 (2007) (citing Dale, 530 U.S. 640; Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
Writing in 1987, Stone acknowledged that Jaycees, NAACP v. Alabama, and Globe
Newspaper Co. could be viewed as having “involved a penalty on expressive activit[ies],”
but such a view, he argued, would be “strained.” Stone, supra note 15, at 112.
Stone, supra note 15, at 112 (emphasis added); see also Stone, supra note 243, at 208
(“[L]aws having only an incidental effect on free expression are presumptively
constitutional and may be invalidated only in the very unusual situation in which they
have a substantial impact on free expression.”). Later in the same article, Stone seems to
reach a somewhat different conclusion, stating that laws are constitutionally suspect
when they have “a highly disproportionate impact on free expression.” Stone, supra note
15, at 114 (emphasis added). I agree with that latter view. My disagreement is only with
Stone’s conclusion that the First Amendment applies “when an incidental restriction
has a significant effect on free expression.” Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth
Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 298 (2009) (emphasis added) (“NAACP v. Alabama, Brown v.
Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee, and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale illustrate such
decisions.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Stone, supra note 243, at 214 (“[T]he Court has
invalidated laws when their impact on free expression was sufficiently severe.”).
Dorf, supra note 15, at 1210. Dorf ’s reference is to incidental burdens on expressive and
nonexpressive conduct.
Remus, Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1497 (noting constitutional protection for
conduct that is “an indispensable condition of free expression.”).
Id. at 1496; see also Ferguson, supra note 59, at 653 (“[I]n the Buckley and Branzburg
decisions, the Court acknowledged that certain forms of noncommunicative conduct
footnote continued on next page
1
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established a right to make financial contributions for spreading a political
message because it is considered fundamental to the First Amendment
guarantees of free speech and association.”249 Charting yet another approach,
Srikanth Srinivasan argues that only laws “inevitably” limiting speech trigger
heightened scrutiny.250
All of these are plausible readings of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
What this Article has tried to show, however, is that efforts to synthesize the
Court’s treatment of speech-facilitating conduct ought to account for historical
change. Importantly, nearly all of the problematic cases cited by Stone, Remus,
and Srinivasan can be understood as employing a conduct-focused approach
that no longer guides Supreme Court doctrine. Although longstanding
precedents are still in place—decisions like Buckley, Abood, and Roberts—the
Court has struggled to redefine their conceptual premises.
Access-to-court decisions might be an exception. Sitting in a courtroom
gallery is not expressive conduct, even if it leads to expression later.251 Scholars
therefore often point to access decisions in support of coverage for speechfacilitating conduct. But does the Globe Newspaper holding support Justice
Brennan’s open-ended declaration that “[t]he First Amendment is . . . broad
enough to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated
in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the
enjoyment of other First Amendment rights”?252
Scholars should be hesitant to glean larger principles from access cases.
Importantly, Justice Brennan considered the First Amendment question in
terms of the systemic effects of a category of governmental action—not based
on the speech effects in particular cases.253 The right of access, for instance,
applies regardless of any speech-related reasons for attending court.254 The
access rulings are still outliers in the Court’s free speech repertoire—notably

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

254.

are essential to the ability to communicate—so essential, in fact, that they cannot be
restricted without also abridging first amendment rights.”).
Remus, Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1496.
Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 402 (noting constitutional scrutiny of laws that “inevitably
burden expression”).
See McDonald, supra note 7, at 269, 326; Stone, supra note 15, at 112 (noting that an
argument to the contrary would be “strained”).
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
Recognizing this feature of access rights, Barry McDonald has criticized the Court for
having “seriously undermined the societal purpose of a right of access by permitting
any member of society to invoke it without demonstrating a ‘public’ justification for
doing so.” McDonald, supra note 7, at 343.
Cf. id. at 325 (“[I]t is probably fair to say that most members of the public are likely to
seek access to a criminal trial for reasons having nothing to do with engaging in speech
about issues of governance.”).
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coming before the decision in Arcara—but they offer little support for broader
First Amendment coverage for speech-facilitating conduct.
IV. Anti-Targeting and Disproportionate Burdens
Anti-targeting defines the Supreme Court’s general approach to speechfacilitating conduct—the clear holding of Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.255—and it
provides, in my view, the most coherent account of decisions in particular
enclaves where the Justices continue to debate the scope of First Amendment
coverage.
This Part fleshes out in greater detail how the anti-targeting concept
works in practice. In particular, it argues that anti-targeting supplies a sound
basis for affording free speech coverage to restrictions on photography and
other forms of audiovisual recording—one of the most interesting emerging
issues in free speech law.
A. Disproportionate Burden Claims
How should courts decide when a law impermissibly targets speech? As
discussed in Part I, courts could reserve heightened scrutiny for laws that
explicitly target speech acts. An ordinance barring protestors from using the
subway, for instance, would explicitly target speech.
But this approach would leave out many efforts to circumscribe speech
indirectly. Consider, for instance, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue,256 where the Supreme Court “struck down a tax
imposed on the sale of large quantities of newsprint and ink because the tax
had the effect of singling out newspapers to shoulder its burden.”257 As the
Court later explained in Arcara, “even though the tax was imposed upon a
nonexpressive activity,” heightened scrutiny still applied because “the burden
of the tax inevitably fell disproportionately—in fact, almost exclusively—upon
the shoulders of newspapers excercising [sic] the constitutionally protected
freedom of the press.”258 (Importantly, this holding is not specific to the Press
Clause; it applies whenever the government “singles out expressive activity for

255.
256.
257.
258.

478 U.S. 697 (1986).
460 U.S. 575 (1983).
Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704.
Id.
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special regulation.”)259 The constitutional defect, in other words, was the law’s
“differential treatment” of newspapers.260
Notably, however, the Court was not endorsing a test where any
incidental speech effects trigger heightened scrutiny, and it was not even
granting free speech coverage for all laws that disproportionately burden
speech. Rather, the constitutional flaw in Minneapolis Star was the fact that “the
burden of the tax inevitably fell disproportionately” on newspapers.261 In other
words, the effects that mattered were the anticipated effects, not the actual
effects. To be sure, the anticipated effects depend on a judicial assessment of the
real world, but the inquiry is legal in nature, not factual.262
Plenty of laws might happen to burden speech disproportionately—that is,
they might happen to burden expressive activities more than nonexpressive
ones. A minimum wage law, for instance, might end up burdening news
agencies more than other businesses. By specifying that heightened review is
triggered by burdens that are inevitably disproportionate, however, the Court
suggests that the disproportionate burden has to be apparent based on an
examination of the law itself, rather than on a fact-intensive inquiry into the
law’s observed effects.263 A minimum wage law does not satisfy this standard
because the law does not target “conduct commonly associated with
expression.”264
Perhaps a harder case is a law banning child labor. For some, this rule
might immediately call to mind an image of kids throwing newspapers onto
neighborhood porches during early morning bike routes. But this example,
too, is properly resolved in favor of the government (i.e., no First Amendment
coverage), because the anti-targeting principle is not concerned simply with
apparent effects on speech but—more precisely—apparent disproportionate
effects on speech compared to the rule’s effects on nonexpressive activities. In the case
of a child labor ban, for instance, newspaper delivery services might be the first
259. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995); see, e.g., Turner

260.
261.
262.
263.

264.

Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (applying heightened scrutiny to
“special obligations upon cable operators”); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653, 2664 (2011) (describing Minneapolis Star as a case about speaker-based
distinctions).
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 583.
Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704 (emphasis added).
Similarly, whether conduct is expressive is socially contingent, based on an assessment
of how people communicate, but courts treat this inquiry as a legal one.
Cf. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988) (applying
heightened scrutiny to “special licensing procedures for conduct commonly associated
with expression”). Michael Dorf similarly concludes that “[t]his category comprises
regulations that, although formally not directed at expression, apply to speech so
disproportionately as to suggest that the government is targeting speech.” Dorf, supra
note 15, at 1205. In other words, “laws subjecting speech to grossly disproportionate
burdens are not incidental burdens at all.” Id.
City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 760-61.
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thing to pop into our minds when we think of kids working, but this intuition
offers little guidance about whether countless other business will similarly lose
out on the benefit of child labor. Thus, a child labor law would not trigger
heightened scrutiny, even when applied to newspapers. A tax on newsprint,
however, would surely have a disproportionate effect on speech because
newsprint is conventionally used for expression. In the end, of course,
boundary cases may become challenging—a point addressed in Part V—but the
question being asked of judges is straightforward: Does the law target
expression or something closely related to expression?
The Supreme Court applies a similar approach to many other
constitutional rights. Under the Equal Protection Clause, for instance, the
Court has explained that “[t]he calculus of effects, the manner in which a
particular law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial
responsibility.”265 Judges considering equal protection claims are thus “called
upon only to measure the basic validity of the legislative classification,” not
any disproportionate burdens that laws happen to impose on a protected
class.266 Indeed, even if legislators know that a law will have effects that
correlate with race, the law is constitutionally unproblematic so long as it is
written in a race-neutral way and does not evince an effort to target particular
racial groups.267 But governmental actions that reveal racial targeting can
trigger heightened scrutiny even if they do not explicitly single out race.268 So
too in free exercise law. “The Free Exercise Clause protects against

265. Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). Others have noted this similarity

between free speech, equal protection, and free exercise. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 15,
at 781 n.15; Smolla, supra note 56, at 1114 & n.68; see also Stone, supra note 245, at 281-83
(pointing out the Equal Protection Clause analog in earlier doctrinal development);
Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
615, 672-73 (1991) (same).
266. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272; see also id. (“[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately
adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” (citing
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); and Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977))).
267. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1987) (rejecting an equal protection
challenge to the death penalty, notwithstanding a documented racially disparate
impact, because “there were legitimate reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt and
maintain capital punishment”); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 876-77 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc) (noting the uniform rejection of equal protection challenges to the
crack/powder sentencing disparity, which also had a well-known racially disparate
impact).
268. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000) (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race.”);
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (plurality opinion) (arguing that some
classifications “should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection
analysis”). Rice v. Cayetano was a Fifteenth Amendment case, but the doctrinal point
would easily apply in other contexts.
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governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt,” but mere differential
effects on religious groups do not trigger heightened review.269
As described above, the “differential treatment” principle in free speech
doctrine operates in a similar way. The pertinent question is a legal one that
asks whether disproportionate burdens on speech are obvious when looking at
the law—not a factual one that asks whether the observed effects of the law are
sufficient to create a constitutional defect, or whether the subjective motives of
particular legislators were malign.270 The reason why is no secret. In the
Court’s view, doctrinal tests better secure expressive freedom when they are
objective, focusing on palpable legal materials and eschewing “amorphous
considerations of intent and effect.”271
In short, regulations targeting “conduct commonly associated with
expression” raise First Amendment concerns.272 Laws targeting journalists,
269. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993); see

also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 70607 (2012) (discussing the requirement of “neutrality” in free exercise doctrine).
270. See Minn. Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983)
(“Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment.”);
see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 117 (1991) (advancing the same idea). Nor will the Court strike down legislation
solely “on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.” City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383
(1968)); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Our appropriate focus is not an empirical enquiry into
the actual intent of the enacting legislature, but rather the existence or not of a current
governmental interest in the service of which the challenged application of the statute
may be constitutional.”). Instead of focusing directly on intent, the doctrine that
implements the anti-targeting principle indirectly combats illicit governmental
motives, and in doing so, it also helps ensure that the government does not arbitrarily
impose disproportionate burdens on speech. Cf. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448
(1991) (noting how First Amendment doctrine ensures that governments do not engage
“in a purposeful attempt to interfere with . . . First Amendment activities”); John Hart
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485 (1975) (noting that a purpose of the
First Amendment is limiting the “gratuitous inhibition of expression”); Kagan, supra
note 15, at 414 (stating that the First Amendment “has as its primary[] . . . object the
discovery of improper governmental motives”). Of course, failing to assess
governmental motives directly may lead to judicial under- or overenforcement
relative to “true” constitutional meaning, cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1113-14 (1989) (criticizing this feature of equal
protection law), but that is a conventional feature of all sorts of constitutional
doctrines that account for judicial administrability, see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon Jr.,
Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1278
(2006) (“Because the demand for judicially manageable standards stands partly distinct
from the search for constitutional meaning, it is not uncommon for judicially
prescribed tests either to underenforce or to overenforce the constitutional norms that
they reflect.” (footnote omitted)).
271. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (plurality opinion).
272. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759-61 (1988).
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book publishers, and artists trigger heightened scrutiny, whereas laws
targeting airlines, pharmaceutical companies, and power plants generally do
not, even though all of these groups sometimes engage in speech and help
facilitate speech.273
B. Recording Restrictions
Do laws that disproportionately burden expression include laws targeting
conventional means of communication, such as cameras and other audiovisual
recording devices? The Supreme Court has not yet had such a case, and scholars
offer widely divergent assessments of why, if at all, recording restrictions
might trigger elevated scrutiny. Meanwhile, lower courts have given the issue
little attention. As one leading scholar puts it, recent cases “in the main assert,
rather than argue for, First Amendment protection” for recordings.274
At first blush, audiovisual recording seems to be, as one court remarked,
“conduct, pure and simple,”275 and perhaps therefore undeserving of any First
Amendment protection. Seth Kreimer proposes an interesting way of
circumventing this doctrinal roadblock. He argues that “the difference between
capturing images and disseminating images erodes rapidly” as images
increasingly “are immediately disseminated upon capture (as in live video
broadcasting).”276 Thus, he asserts, limiting protection to “users who upload
their images immediately and automatically” would put “undue weight on
273. Id. at 761 (distinguishing a law targeting newspapers from one targeting soda vendors

on the basis that “[n]ewspapers are in the business of expression, while soda vendors are
in the business of selling soft drinks”). Two additional points regarding the generality
of laws: First, a provision that targets speech implicates the First Amendment even if
the overall regulatory scheme is neutral (or even favorable) toward speech. See
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 577-85. (For a dissenting view, see id. at 593-94 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); and id. at 596 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).)
Second, the presence of exceptions for some nonspeech interests probably does not
undermine the law’s generality unless the exceptions are so extensive that they reveal
an effort to target speech. Cf. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 (employing this approach in the
free exercise context). For instance, issuing subpoenas to journalists does not implicate
the First Amendment, see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (citing
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)), even though subpoena laws typically exempt
lawyers, doctors, spouses, etc. An alternative approach would make speech a “most
favored interest”—where as soon as exceptions exist for other social interests, but not
for speech, the law loses its “generally applicable” status. Cf. Fraternal Order of Police
Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 361, 366-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito,
J.) (employing this approach in the free exercise context).
274. Kreimer, supra note 32, at 368.
275. D’Amario v. Providence Civic Ctr. Auth., 639 F. Supp. 1538, 1541 (D.R.I. 1986), aff’d
mem., 815 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 52, at 1156 (“[I]t
is unclear that taking photographs or gathering sound should be regarded as ‘acts of
communication and expression.’”); McDonald, supra note 7, at 270; Mishra, supra note
52, at 1550-51. But see Smolla, supra note 56, at 1112 (arguing that laws restricting
paparazzi photography are “triggered only by acts of communication and expression”).
276. Kreimer, supra note 32, at 376.
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technological fortuity.”277 Kreimer exposes how the line between expression
and nonexpressive conduct can blur at the margins, but his doctrinal solution
is unsatisfying to me. Conceptually, and typically, recording and disseminating
are two separate acts. The fact that these acts are sometimes merged by
“technological fortuity” is an unpersuasive reason to abandon the line between
protected expression and unprotected conduct.278
Jane Bambauer offers a different theory. First Amendment doctrine, she
points out, is undergirded by concerns of protecting the creation of knowledge
and preventing improper governmental motives. Putting these together,
Bambauer argues that “state action will trigger the First Amendment any time
it purposefully interferes with the creation of knowledge.”279 Thus, she
maintains, all privacy-protecting laws, including audiovisual recording
restrictions, should trigger heightened scrutiny.280 Bambauer makes a
significant contribution—especially in the emphasis on laws rather than
individual expressive aims—but her far-reaching prescription relies on the
questionable argument that restricting access to otherwise private information
abridges a freedom of thought derived from the First Amendment.281
In my view, the anti-targeting principle offers a better account of why
recording restrictions trigger heightened scrutiny. Cameras and other
audiovisual recording devices are conventional means of communication—that
is, they are conventionally used for communicative purposes.282 Targeted
regulations of audiovisual recording thus single out conduct commonly

277. Id. at 377.
278. See generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (distinguishing between

279.
280.
281.

282.

acquisition and dissemination). Along similar lines as Kreimer, Jane Bambauer argues
that “it would be odd if First Amendment analysis of [regulations of] data could be
radically changed just by moving data across a human eyeball.” Bambauer, supra note
32, at 83 n.114. It is doubtful that “moving data across a human eyeball” makes conduct
expressive, see supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text, but in any event it does not
seem odd to me that doctrines implementing freedom of expression might ask whether
regulated conduct is expressive.
Bambauer, supra note 32, at 63.
Id. at 83; see also id. at 63 (“[F]or all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to
the current debates in information law, data is speech.”).
Consider, for instance, the difference between audiovisual-recording restrictions and
laws against wiretapping. In the case of recording restrictions, the regulated party
generally has lawful access to the relevant information, and thus, as Bambauer
observes, recording restrictions seem “designed to cut down on communicative
potential,” implicating First Amendment concerns. Id. at 83. The first-order aim of a
wiretapping law, however, is to prevent access to private information, not to prevent
dissemination of that information. The law thus seeks to prevent noncommunicative
harm, and the connection to freedom of expression is at best attenuated.
Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 577 n.4 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (encouraging use of the term “conventionally expressive” rather than
“inherently expressive”).
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associated with expression and impose an apparent disproportionate burden on
speech.283
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently employed this
approach in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez.284 The case involved an Illinois statute
making it a felony to record “all or any part of any conversation” without the
consent of all conversing parties,285 “regardless of whether one or more of the
parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under
circumstances justifying that expectation.”286 The ACLU and several of its
employees challenged the statute as applied, asserting First Amendment
protection for their plans to record “matters of public concern.”287 The district
court denied their request for a preliminary injunction because audiovisual
recording is not protected expression.288
On appeal, a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court
framed its analysis in terms of the law’s targeting of the speech process. “[T]he
eavesdropping statute operates at the front end of the speech process by
restricting the use of a common, indeed ubiquitous, instrument of
communication,” the Seventh Circuit explained.289 Maintaining focus on the
Illinois statute rather than the ACLU’s expressive aims, the court held that

283. See supra notes 256-73 and accompanying text. Kreimer deserves credit for developing

this argument:
Emerging efforts to constrain image capture do not target actions collateral to expression—
they sanction the disposition of information itself. Like prohibitions on sketching, taking
notes, or memorializing observations in a diary, they bar individuals who have already
acquired information from preserving it for future review, reflection, and dissemination. As
such, they are not “generally applicable” regulations of conduct that adventitiously interfere
with speech; rather they are targeted regulations in which the very definition of violation
involves interference with a medium of expression.

Kreimer, supra note 32, at 391-92.
284. 679 F.3d 583, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2012). To be sure, the court’s lengthy discussion mentions

285.
286.
287.

288.
289.

several possible rationales for applying heightened scrutiny, but the court’s holding
was that even if incidental speech burdens cannot trigger First Amendment review of a general
law, the speech-inhibiting effects of a recording ban are “far from incidental” because
“the statute specifically targets a communication technology.” Id. at 601-02.
2005 Ill. Laws 1917 (codified at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2014)), invalidated by
People v. Melongo, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014).
2007 Ill. Laws 2539 (codified as amended at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2015)).
Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois at 4-8,
Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (No. 11-1286), 2011 WL 3892663. Particularly, the ACLU planned
to engage in “open audio recording of on-duty police speaking audibly in public places
while discharging their public duties.” Id. at 1.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 589.
Id. at 596; see also id. (“Restricting the use of an audio or audiovisual recording device
suppresses speech just as effectively as restricting the dissemination of the resulting
recording.”).
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some form of heightened scrutiny applies to “[l]aws that restrict the use of
expressive media.”290
Scholars have casually characterized the Alvarez decision as recognizing a
“right to record,”291 but the Seventh Circuit avoided saying that recording is
“protected conduct.”292 Rightly so. The Illinois eavesdropping statute targeted
only the capture of audiovisual material, not its dissemination, and therefore
did not regulate expression. The ACLU obtained heightened review, instead,
because the Illinois eavesdropping statute “specifically target[ed] a
communication technology . . . [and thus] burden[ed] First Amendment rights
directly, not incidentally.”293
Under Alvarez, plenty of restrictions on other types of mechanical devices
would not trigger any First Amendment scrutiny. Machines that enable access
to otherwise private information—thermal imaging or wiretapping devices,
for instance—are not conventional means of expression, regardless of whether
they happen to include a recording feature. Consequently, a law targeting
thermal imaging or wiretapping devices would not raise a constitutional
problem,294 even when expressive goals inspire the use of those devices, or
even when those devices are equipped with a recording feature.
Although praising the decision in part, Ashutosh Bhagwat has criticized
Alvarez for its “fatally flawed” analysis that recording “necessarily targets an
‘expressive activity.’”295 The court’s explanation is terse,296 but Bhagwat may
290. Id. at 595; see also id. at 602 (“[T]he statute specifically targets a communication

291.
292.

293.

294.

295.
296.

technology; the use of an audio recorder—a medium of expression—triggers criminal
liability.”).
See Bambauer, supra note 32, at 84.
Indeed, the court took pains to emphasize that it was not “immuniz[ing] behavior,” and
that the government was free to restrict recording incidentally using a general rule.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607. “It goes without saying that the police may take all reasonable
steps to maintain safety and control, secure crime scenes and accident sites, and protect
the integrity and confidentiality of investigations,” the majority explained. Id. “While
an officer surely cannot issue a ‘move on’ order to a person because he is recording, the
police may order bystanders to disperse for reasons related to public safety and order
and other legitimate law-enforcement needs.” Id.
Id. at 602-03. Moreover, while the Seventh Circuit discussed the public-accountability
backdrop of the ACLU’s challenge, see id. at 597-600, the court did not apply heightened
scrutiny based on a decision that the planned recordings were of public concern. The
court mentioned that concept only once. See id. at 597. Nor did the Alvarez majority
base its decision on impermissible governmental motives.
Froomkin, supra note 8, at 1510 (“General regulation of new technologies such as
thermal imaging or passive wave imaging seems unproblematic on First Amendment
grounds so long as the regulation were to apply to all uses.”).
Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1040 (quoting Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 602-03).
In full, the court explained:
The Illinois eavesdropping statute may or may not be a law of general applicability; as we
have noted, it contains a number of exemptions. Either way, it should be clear by now that its
effect on First Amendment interests is far from incidental. To the contrary, the statute
specifically targets a communication technology; the use of an audio recorder—a medium of

footnote continued on next page
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misunderstand the Seventh Circuit’s reason for viewing the eavesdropping
statute’s speech effects as “far from incidental.”297 The Alvarez decision does not
rely—at least not explicitly—on the erroneous notion that every application of
a recording ban necessarily restricts expression. Rather, the opinion simply
says that the targeting of “a communication technology” created the First
Amendment problem.298 By analogy, not all newsprint is used to produce
newspapers,299 and not all campaign contributions go toward expressive
activities,300 but laws that target newsprint or political campaigns have readily
apparent disproportionate effects on speech. In determining whether speech
effects are “incidental,” what seems to matter under Alvarez is what the law
targets, not whether expressive goals are impeded.301
Of course, this approach, along with any legal framework that
incorporates social facts, could require difficult line drawing and, potentially,
introduce path dependency into free speech law. That is, the ways that people
communicate may depend, in part, on what the law allows. But this criticism is
largely theoretical. In practice, whether people communicate with cell phones
or thermal imaging devices has more to do with technological capacity than
with questions of First Amendment coverage. In any event, legal doctrines
often rely to some extent on social facts or norms, even when law has a role in
shaping those norms.
V. Defending Anti-Targeting
The anti-targeting principle has quietly become the defining feature of a
broad range of free speech law. This Part briefly defends this doctrinal
approach. Without returning to first principles—an effort that would extend
well beyond the scope of this Article—my emphasis is on widely accepted
expression—triggers criminal liability. The law’s legal sanction is directly leveled against the
expressive element of an expressive activity. As such, the statute burdens First Amendment
rights directly, not incidentally.

Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 602-03.
297. Id. at 602.
298. Id.
299. See Newsprint Paper Rolls & Newsprint Paper Sheets, U.S. PACKAGING & WRAPPING

LLC (Sept. 1, 2011), http://packagingblog.org/2011/09/01/newsprint-paper-rolls
-newsprint-paper-sheets (listing many nonexpressive uses of newsprint, including as
wrapping paper, packaging material, and disposable table cloths).
300. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 263 (1976) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[M]oney is not always equivalent to or used for speech, even in
the context of political campaigns.”).
301. It is worth emphasizing, once again, that this Article deals only with the question of
First Amendment “coverage,” not whether particular recording restrictions should
survive some form of heightened scrutiny. For scholarship addressing this issue, see
Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1069.
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interests, such as combating illicit motives, ensuring ample opportunities for
speech, and maintaining judicially administrable standards.302
A. Protecting Nonexpressive Conduct
One view of the First Amendment is that freedom of expression protects
only expressive acts, and therefore nonexpressive conduct is entirely
unprotected. “[A]lthough the Supreme Court has defined the boundaries of
expression broadly,” one court of appeals has explained, “it never has extended
the protections of the First Amendment to non-expressive conduct.”303 If
“there is no expression at issue,” the court continued, “First Amendment
doctrine simply has no application.”304
Existing doctrine, however, does recognize free speech protection for
nonexpressive conduct in many circumstances. And rightly so. Denying
heightened scrutiny to all regulations of nonexpressive conduct might seem
plausible at first glance, but the implications of that approach would be
startling. The government could ban the purchase of computers or printing
presses, prohibit the pooling of money for speech purposes, and require
citizens to give money to partisan newspapers that support the government. It
would be odd indeed if the government could target the preconditions of
speech without any restraints.
Asking whether regulated conduct is “expressive” therefore cannot resolve
the question of First Amendment coverage. As Robert Post observes, a myopic
focus on expressive conduct “frames the threshold condition for triggering
First Amendment scrutiny far too narrowly.”305 Instead, “our First
Amendment jurisprudence is concerned not merely with what is regulated, but

302. Accordingly, this Part will not attempt a systematic assessment of the anti-targeting

principle according to particular “theories” of the First Amendment. See generally
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (discussing First
Amendment values); Schauer, supra note 19, at 1786 (mentioning various such theories).
Most people do not view speech and press freedoms through a single lens, instead
weaving together a collection of First Amendment values and creating a patchwork
free speech doctrine. See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1786 (“[I]f there exists a single theory
that can explain the First Amendment’s coverage, it has not yet been found.”); Stone,
supra note 245, at 276 (“[T]here is no unified field theory of the First Amendment—no
single test that can apply to all cases.”). Moreover, the term “freedom” can be
multifaceted, so the First Amendment may simultaneously afford free speech coverage
to expressive conduct and against targeted laws. Proponents of anti-targeting need not
endorse Justice Scalia’s broader view that First Amendment rights are solely shields
against laws.
303. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
304. Id.; see also U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (“As a threshold
requirement for the application of the First Amendment, the government action must
abridge or restrict protected speech.”).
305. Post, supra note 50, at 1255.
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also with why the state seeks to impose regulations.”306 Viewed from the
perspective of the individual, the First Amendment must extend some
protection for speech-facilitating conduct; otherwise the government could
starve the supply of speech. Restrictions on speech, after all, can occur at
different stages of the speech process.
B. Problems with Conduct-Based Approaches
As discussed in Part I, one way to protect nonexpressive conduct would be
to ask whether regulations of that conduct burden speech. The difficulty with
this approach is that “virtually every law restricts conduct, and virtually any
prohibited conduct can be performed for an expressive purpose.”307 For
instance, “[a] parking ordinance incidentally restricts speech when applied
against an illegally-parked newspaper delivery van,” and “the tax code burdens
speech when used to tax a book publisher.”308 But few people think that these
circumstances ought to trigger heightened review. Forcing judges to review all
incidental-burden claims, Geoffrey Stone remarks, “would be a judicial
nightmare”309 and “would open the door to endless litigation and encourage all
sorts of fraudulent claims.”310 Indeed, the principal rationale for not granting
constitutional protection to speech-facilitating conduct, the Supreme Court
has explained, “is largely one of practicality.”311
Most scholars applying First Amendment coverage based on the effects of
a regulation on speech recognize the impracticality of applying heightened
scrutiny to every law. Instead, they propose restricting coverage either to
particular types of incidental burdens defined by subject matter, or to
incidental burdens that substantially burden speech. These two ideas are briefly
addressed in turn. Both approaches, in my view, face intractable problems.
1.

Domain-specific approaches

One framework would limit coverage for speech-facilitating conduct to
particular subjects or domains.312 Some proposals, for instance, call for giving

306. Id. (emphasis omitted).
307. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

judgment). This point is widely recognized in the literature. See, e.g., Larry A.
Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 930-31 (1993); Dorf, supra note 15, at 1208; Leslie Kendrick, Speech,
Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1683 (2013).
Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 405.
Stone, supra note 243, at 208.
Stone, supra note 245, at 298.
Stone, supra note 243, at 208.
See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
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special legal privileges to journalists.313 Others argue that coverage should
depend on whether the activity is especially beneficial to the public.314 These
issue-by-issue or speaker-by-speaker approaches are referred to here as
“domain-specific.”
A domain-specific framework would have certain notable benefits. Most
significantly, ad hoc analysis would allow for more finely tuned doctrine
tailored to the particular First Amendment interests at stake in each situation.
A domain-specific approach also would find some support in other aspects of
free speech doctrine.315 Speech about public figures or public issues, for
instance, sometimes receives stronger First Amendment protection than does
speech concerning private figures or private issues.316 Similarly, the Supreme
Court has determined that some categories of speech have less value and
deserve little or no protection.317
Nonetheless, a domain-specific approach to nonexpressive conduct would
come with considerable drawbacks.
First, this approach would create enormous content-based line-drawing
problems. The main challenge would be determining whether a particular
domain ought to receive special protection. Proponents of scientific-research
privileges, for instance, assert that scientific research is “a central and unique
part of a highly favored process.”318 But how should judges decide whether
313. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 7, at 338 n.301 (“[A] newsgatherer defending against the

315.
316.

317.

318.

application of general laws would first need to meet a ‘threshold’ showing of ‘news
value’ before even being eligible for such a balancing analysis.”).
Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1837,
1840 (1999) (“[T]he First Amendment has domain-specific applications . . . .”).
See Snyder v. Phelps, 132 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“[W]here matters of purely private
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.”).
Interestingly, however, the Justices sometimes disfavor legislative efforts to carve out
special treatment of newsworthy information. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,
648-49 (1984) (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (explaining that certain
categories of speech, such as fighting words, libel, and incitement, are generally
excluded from First Amendment coverage); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (“[C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection . . . .”
(second alteration in original) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447,
456 (1978))). But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424-26
(1993) (limiting governmental efforts to distinguish commercial and noncommercial
speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) (explaining that some
forms of expression have “constitutionally proscribable content” but still are not
“entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for
content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content” (emphasis
omitted)).
Roy G. Spece, Jr. & Jennifer Weinzierl, First Amendment Protection of Experimentation: A
Critical Review and Tentative Synthesis/Reconstruction of the Literature, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 185, 214 (1998).
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science is “highly favored” compared to other disciplines, like journalism?319
And determining which domains to protect is only the beginning of the linedrawing difficulties. Judges would then have to define each domain’s scope.
What counts as “scientific research” or “journalism”? Adopting a domainspecific view would require drawing content-based boundaries that define each
domain.320
Doctrines based on the identity of the speaker would pose even greater
challenges. Consider, for example, the notion of giving a special newsgathering
privilege to journalists. “Recognizing the privilege,” Lillian BeVier observes,
“would inevitably entail the necessity of resolving difficult definitional issues,
as courts would be forced to decide which claimants were legitimately entitled
to call themselves ‘journalists’ and which were not.”321 It seems highly
questionable that judges are in a position to make these types of unguided
judgments,322 and the Supreme Court has shown a general unwillingness to
venture into this uncharted territory.323
This discussion is not meant to disparage doctrines that require line
drawing. Nearly every aspect of modern free speech law separates cases into
categories, asking whether conduct is expressive, whether the governmental
action is content based, and so on. The anti-targeting framework—to which we
319. See Francione, supra note 52, at 477 (“[T]here is simply no reason to accept that

320.

321.
322.

323.

information-gathering is more important for scientists than for journalists.”); Remus,
Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1503 (“There is no basis for asserting that the
preconditions of scientific speech should receive greater protection than preconditions
of any other forms of protected speech.”).
See, e.g., Francione, supra note 52, at 503-04; McDonald, supra note 7, at 309. Notably, as
the definition of a protected domain becomes broader, the reasons for protecting that
domain may become weaker. See Francione, supra note 52, at 463 (“If the general view
seeks prima facie protection for every instance of what is sincerely claimed to be
experimentation [or] research, then the general view would undercut its own premise
that the first amendment should protect science because of its inestimable practical
value to society and its theoretical importance to the marketplace of ideas.”). Similar
problems arise in determining what counts as a matter of public concern. See MaryRose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 57879 (2007); Eugene Volokh, The Trouble with “Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free
Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (2011). Some scholars see these problems as
surmountable. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1065 (arguing for a test that applies
when conduct “contributes in some substantial way to democratic self-governance”).
Lillian R. BeVier, The Journalist’s Privilege—A Skeptic’s View, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 467,
467 (2006).
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 74, at 438 (“There is no coherent way to distinguish the
institutional press from others who disseminate information and opinion to the public
through communications media.”).
See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (“The balancing of conflicting
interests of this type is particularly a legislative function.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (“The dangers and the undesirability of making [free speech]
determination[s] on the basis of factors such as the size of the audience or the probity of
the speaker’s ideas are obvious.”).
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will return shortly—is no different, requiring sometimes-challenging
assessments of whether laws target speech or conduct closely related to
speech.324 At the end of the day, some distinctions are essential; otherwise, First
Amendment law would become a case-specific balancing test with virtually no
predictability. And it is fallacious to suppose “that a distinction that cannot be
sharply drawn cannot be drawn at all.”325
A domain-specific approach, however, would require judges to make
distinctions that they are especially ill suited to make. Whether audiovisual
recording is conventionally expressive, for instance, requires only a basic
understanding of American society; whether a journalist’s nonexpressive acts
should enjoy special protection, by contrast, is far more a question of policy.
Even for those comfortable with judicial policymaking, it is worth noting that
most First Amendment doctrine is deliberately structured so that value-based
choices (which are inevitable in any legal regime) are made only at a high level
of abstraction, with a resulting web of categories and doctrines that seek to
preclude content-based policy judgments in particular cases. “In the most
profound sense,” Frederick Schauer explains, “the first amendment stands as a
barrier to excess subdivision.”326
2.

Substantial-burdens approaches

An alternative framework would apply heightened scrutiny whenever a
regulation of nonexpressive conduct substantially burdens expression.327 In
theory, this approach has considerable appeal. By employing a uniform method
based on a neutral principle, this approach ostensibly would solve many of the
line-drawing problems of the domain-specific approach. In practice, though,
the problems created by a substantial-burdens method would likely prove even
more unmanageable and underprotective of speech interests.328
The most difficult challenges of a substantial-burdens framework are
figuring out how to measure burdens and determining what level of generality
to use in making that assessment.

324. See supra Part IV.A.
325. Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56

CINN. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (1988); see also Stone, supra note 243, at 209 n.75 (“[T]his is
sometimes the nature of legal reasoning. General principles are useful to distinguish
among different types of cases, but the principles are almost always imprecise at the
margins.”).
326. Schauer, supra note 325, at 1198.
327. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 15 (advocating this approach).
328. Dorf recognizes many of these difficulties, but he does not respond to them “because
they cannot be adequately addressed in the abstract.” Id. at 1210. In my view, these
problems are insurmountable.
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One possibility would be for judges to make case-specific assessments of
the burdens on speech.329 A problem with measuring incidental speech burdens
in these cases, however, is that regulations of nonexpressive conduct
necessarily require an additional causal step before they burden speech.330
Sometimes, identifying significant burdens on speech would be simple enough,
but often this approach would require a perplexing counterfactual inquiry. In
newsgathering cases, for instance, courts would need to determine what
information claimants could have found by alternative means—an inquiry that
judges frequently will be in no position to answer.
Notably, this problem of attenuated burdens usually does not arise with
respect to other exemption rights against general laws. Free speech
accommodations under O’Brien and free exercise accommodations prior to
Employment Division v. Smith,331 for example, involve burdens that fall directly
on the constitutionally relevant activity. Under O’Brien, the restriction is
imposed directly on expressive activities, so the case-specific effect on
expression is readily apparent. The same is true in religious accommodation
cases, where individuals attest directly to whether the governmental
regulation causes significant burdens on their religious beliefs or practices.332
With claims based on speech-facilitating conduct, however, the effect on
speech would often be unclear.
Similarly, looking to case-specific speech effects would make rights to
engage in nonexpressive conduct dependent on contingencies unknown at the
time of the regulated conduct. Consider, for instance, someone who sees a
police officer performing her duties in public and decides to start recording.
Should the legality of this amateur recorder’s conduct depend on whether he
later puts the video online, or whether the recorded events become difficult to
recount through other means? That would be unsettling (and potentially
chilling) to the videographer. Similarly, it would be strange if a presumptive
329. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 677 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting);

Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 710 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
330. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990) (noting that “the injury to academic
freedom claimed by petitioner” was “remote and attenuated . . . [and] also speculative”);
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690, 693-94 (noting that burdens on newsgathering were
“consequential, but uncertain,” and “to a great extent speculative,” producing “widely
divergent” estimates).
331. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
332. To be sure, there may be logical steps between the governmental restriction and its
burdensome effect. Cf. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 199 (“[B]urdens that are less than direct
may sometimes pose First Amendment concerns . . . .”). My point, which is orthogonal
to that issue, is that the evidence of the burdensome effect is direct; courts simply inquire
whether the religious beliefs or practices of the relevant individuals are burdened by
the regulation. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014)
(stating that “federal courts have no business addressing” the question “whether the
religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable”).

59

Speech-Facilitating Conduct
68 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2016)

right to engage in scientific research were triggered only when the results lead
to publishable results,333 or if a presumptive right to trespass for expressive
purposes were dependent on what intruders end up discovering.334
Courts using case-specific assessments would also lack a uniform way of
evaluating the significance of burdens. As Srikanth Srinivasan points out,
“calculating the degree of speech-restrictive effect in different situations. . . .
along a common metric seems unworkable, which makes comparing their
extent in different circumstances largely guesswork.”335 Indeed, even in similar
circumstances, the inquiry would be unwieldy. For instance, how should courts
evaluate claimed tax exemptions for someone who spends every marginal
dollar on speech, compared to someone who spends every tenth marginal
dollar on speech? Would a general income tax impose a substantial burden on
the first person but not the second? What if the tax effectively prevented an
individual from buying a television advertisement, forcing her to purchase a
radio spot instead? Should the IRS have to defend the assessment based on the
particular circumstances presented by this reluctant radio advertiser? Would
we care about the other ways that she chooses to spend her money—that she
owns an expensive car, for instance? These would be routine cases.
Case-by-case analyses would also lead to case-by-case results, creating
considerable doctrinal instability and undermining free speech values. “It turns
out to be incredibly difficult to identify and assess all of the many factors that
should go into [a balancing] judgment on a case-by-case basis,” Geoffrey Stone
explains.336 Consequently, the use of a case-specific approach “would produce a
highly uncertain, unpredictable, and fact-dependent set of outcomes that
would leave speakers, police officers, prosecutors, jurors, and judges in a state
of constant uncertainty.”337
333. See Remus, Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1503; Robertson, supra note 54, at 1218
334.

335.
336.
337.

n.57.
As noted below, the typical response to this objection is to identify the relevant rule at
a higher level of abstraction, applicable to many cases even though “not all of the
considerations which justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each particular case
decided under its authority.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 414.
Stone, supra note 245, at 275-76. Stone’s point relates to case-specific analysis generally,
not just the analysis that might apply to speech-facilitating conduct.
Id.; see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 (“Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs of
the press and the individual’s claim to compensation for wrongful injury might be
struck on a case-by-case basis. . . . But this approach would lead to unpredictable results
and uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower courts
unmanageable.”); see also, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 66
(2008) (“Given the vagaries of fair use doctrine, fair use thus provides a highly
permeable, often merely theoretical, defense of First Amendment interests.”); Jones,
supra note 56, at 1225 (stating that reporter-privileges doctrine “is uniformly regarded
as confusing, resulting in a ‘privilege’ that is ambiguous, inconsistent, and the subject of
significant criticism” (footnotes omitted)); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A.
Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1496-97 (2007) (“[A]pplication of the law
footnote continued on next page
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Collectively, the many problems with a case-specific approach suggest that
free speech rights would need to be identified at a higher level of generality. By
evaluating whether certain classes or categories of behavior give rise to
substantial burdens, judges could provide individuals with far greater notice of
their rights and could avoid unwieldy case-specific inquiries into speechrestrictive effects.
But despite its considerable advantages over a case-by-case approach, an
approach that focused on speech burdens in various categories would almost
surely prove unworkable too.
First, the myriad factual problems described above would resurface, but
instead of making case-specific factual determinations, judges would have to
make classwide factual determinations. Do promissory estoppel laws
substantially restrict news reporting? It is hard to know, largely because of the
attenuated nature of the burdens on speech. Would judges answer this factual
question as a matter of law, guided by logic and intuition? Doing so could have
advantages, but it might also make decisions appear artificial or contrived.338
On the other hand, the Supreme Court is generally averse to using empirical
evidence to answer broad-reaching constitutional questions.339
Perhaps worse, a category-based assessment of speech effects would require
judges to engage in the unbounded enterprise of trying to define the relevant
categories. Countless variables could be relevant. Consider a newsgathering
claim where a journalist in the French Quarter of New Orleans gained
unauthorized access to a private computer. At what level of generality should
judges determine the effect on speech in order to decide whether restrictions of
that conduct trigger heightened scrutiny? Would the relevant category be
journalists who gain unauthorized access to computers, or journalists who
commit any tort? Would local circumstances enter the picture, or would courts
assess the burdens on a statewide or nationwide basis? Perhaps the dynamics of
news reporting differ between Louisiana and Arkansas, or between New
Orleans and Shreveport, or between the First Ward and the French Quarter.
Perhaps professional sports reporters and amateur national-security bloggers
deserve separate analysis. Perhaps speech effects differ year-to-year, or monthto-month, depending on innumerable factors that courts have no competency
to judge.
Nor should judges rely on claimants to frame the relevant categories.
Determining First Amendment coverage is a question of law, and judges ought

[of fair use] has become so unpredictable that would-be fair-users can rarely rely on the
doctrine with any significant level of confidence.”).
338. Cf. McConnell, supra note 74, at 451-52 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United for holding that independent expenditures do not create a risk of
corruption).
339. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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to decide questions of law without regard to the legal theories advanced by the
parties in a particular case.340 If a claimant asserted that her conduct was
covered by the First Amendment based on the substantial burden of tort
actions on journalists in southern Louisiana, the court would need to decide on
its own if the claimant had correctly framed the relevant category for assessing
the substantiality of speech burdens.
As these decisions move to higher and higher levels of abstraction—as they
surely would once judges confront these impossibly difficult line-drawing
problems—the relevant tests would start to look more and more like questions
of public policy rather than constitutional law,341 forcing judges to weigh
speculative costs against speculative benefits. The substantial-burdens
approach—ostensibly content neutral—would thus likely become the domainspecific approach in practice, requiring judges to make a wide range of contentbased policy judgments.
C. Advantages of an Anti-Targeting Approach
An anti-targeting approach avoids the content-based line-drawing
problems that would overwhelm other methods. Instead, judges would assess
legal rules using a content-neutral metric, determining whether rules target
speech—either on their face or by targeting “conduct commonly associated
with expression.”342
To be sure, this inquiry would not always lead to easy answers.343
Restrictions on audiovisual recording, for instance, are especially challenging
because they do not necessarily restrict expression, yet by targeting a
340. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99-100 (1991).
341. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular

Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 699
(2006) (“Both in daily parlance and as a technical matter, we draw a line between law
and politics and see them as distinct categories.”). This is not to suggest that a neat line
divides the two realms. My point is simply that as the level of generality rises,
determining the “significance” of the speech burden moves further from the judicial
ken.
342. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759-61 (1988). Similarly,
whether conduct is expressive or nonexpressive does not require a content-based
judgment. See Steve Keane, Note, The Case Against Blanket First Amendment Protection of
Scientific Research: Articulating a More Limited Scope of Protection, 59 STAN. L. REV. 505, 527
(2006) (“A critically important feature of expressive conduct theory is that it does not
require a judgment about what qualifies as science.”).
343. See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 788 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s new ‘nexus to
expression, or to conduct commonly associated with expression’ test is peculiarly
troublesome, because it is of uncertain scope and vague expanse.”). For one court’s
struggle deciding whether encryption source code is closely related to expression, see
Bernstein v. U.S. Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1139-42 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc
granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); and id. at 1149 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting).
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conventional means of expression, they seem to be more speech-targeted than
ordinary regulations of conduct. With these and other laws, judges have to
determine in a common law fashion which types of laws are targeted and
which types are not. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the Court has
recognized this category of free speech law since the 1980s, with no apparent
paralysis or disarray in lower courts. And a similar inquiry features
prominently in other areas of constitutional law.344
An anti-targeting approach is also likely to account for the mine-run of
cases where the government has acted for improper reasons. As Elena Kagan
persuasively argues, when a law targets speech, “a legislator cannot help but
consider, consciously or not, whether and how the law will affect particular
messages.”345 As Kagan puts it, “this is to say little more than that when a law is
about speech, the legislator will consider its impact on speech—a proposition
neither deep nor shocking.”346 Once the First Amendment is deemed to apply,
judges use heightened scrutiny to help ensure the government is acting for
legitimate reasons.347
Importantly, a heightened risk of improper speech-related motives also
arises when an ostensibly general law has apparent disproportionate effects on
speech.348 Kagan explains:
The relevance of hugely disproportionate impact to the level of scrutiny is, under
a motive-based approach, no great mystery. What separates direct from
incidental restraints is breadth: whether the law applies to more than just speech.
If an incidental restraint has no such sweep, effectively regulating only speech,
then the danger it poses of illicit motive approaches the level associated with
direct restraints, and the same standard of review thus should obtain.349

In sum, laws that target speech on their face or in their obvious effects pose a
substantially higher risk of illicit motive.
This danger of improper motives is present, though perhaps to a lesser
degree, when laws target conventional means of expression, such as cameras
and other audiovisual recording devices. To be sure, a recording device, just
like a computer or a printing press, can be used for nonexpressive purposes.
(For instance, these machines could serve as decorations, toys, or investments.)
But the conventional use of a recording device is to capture audiovisual content
in order to convey that content to others. A legislature that targets audiovisual
recording is thus likely to have that conveyance of information in mind when it
restricts the front-end use of the recording device.
See supra notes 265-69.
Kagan, supra note 15, at 496.
Id.; see Stone, supra note 245, at 298 (making the same point).
See generally Kagan, supra note 15 (explaining how free speech law is largely structured
to combat illicit governmental motives).
348. Id. at 496.
349. Id. at 498; see Dorf, supra note 15, at 1205.
344.
345.
346.
347.
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Consider ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez,350 where an Illinois statute barred the
capture of audio without the consent of the recorded parties. The
governmental interests in that case did not stem from the mere capture of the
audio; indeed, the conversations that the ACLU wanted to record were already
audible to those within earshot. Rather, as Judge Posner aptly explained (albeit
in dissent), the legislature was seeking to prevent the conveyance of recorded
conversations to a broader audience, and the most effective means of
preventing such communication was to ban recordings at the front end. “The
distinction . . . between an overheard private conversation recalled from
memory and one that is recorded is something that everyone feels,” Judge
Posner remarked.351
Of course, the government may have ample reason to restrict the
recording of audiovisual content that is otherwise available to members of the
public. An interest in conversational privacy, for instance, may justify laws
that restrict surreptitious recording.352 This Article takes no view on that issue.
But the predominant reason for a legislature to restrict the recording of
otherwise available information is concern over the dissemination of that
information to a broader audience.353 And that is exactly the type of likely
speech-related motive that has led courts to apply heightened scrutiny.354
By contrast, general laws that do not reveal any effort to target speech are
typically “poor vehicles for censorial designs.”355 As the Supreme Court has
explained, “laws of general application that are not aimed at conduct
commonly associated with expression . . . carry with them little danger of
censorship” and “provide too blunt a censorship instrument to warrant judicial
intervention prior to an allegation of actual misuse.”356 Moreover, when laws
are general, their broad-ranging application increases the chance that ordinary
politics will account for any unduly burdensome effects.357

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

355.
356.
357.

679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 612 (Posner, J., dissenting).
See supra note 301.
Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (per curiam) (making a similar observation
about contribution caps).
See supra note 270. Content-based recording statutes, such as bans on recording
industry practices on industrial farms, raise even more acute concerns about
governmental efforts to restrict the conveyance of information by targeting the front
end of the speech process. See Kevin C. Adam, Note, Shooting the Messenger: A CommonSense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag” Legislation Under the First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1129, 1169-70 (2012).
Kagan, supra note 15, at 496; see also id. at 489 (making a similar point).
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760-61 (1988).
This point is widely recognized. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 445-46
(1991).
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court has wisely abandoned a vacillating and confusing
practice of applying heightened scrutiny to regulations of nonexpressive
conduct based on incidental burdens on speech. Good reasons may support
granting First Amendment coverage in particular cases, but the doctrinal
problem of incidental burdens on nonexpressive conduct has not admitted of a
principled and predictable solution that relies on incidental speech effects.
Anti-targeting offers a far better course. Stepping back from a granular
focus on particular rights, a broader guiding principle comes into view that
brings together the Court’s disparate treatment of various types of speechfacilitating conduct. It is indeed true that “[l]aws enacted to control or suppress
speech may operate at different points in the speech process.”358 But free speech
rights do not protect particular forms of speech-facilitating conduct. When
nonexpressive conduct is regulated, it is the law, rather than individual aims,
that brings the First Amendment into play. Speech-facilitating conduct is
protected indirectly—through rights against targeted governmental
interference with speech.

358. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010).
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